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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays in population and family economics.
The first chapter studies ethnic peer effects in the intergenerational transmission of skills.
In order to determine whether the correlation between individual measures of human
capital and ethnic group averages in the previous generation is not driven by omitted
variables and measurement error, I develop an instrumental variables strategy that uses
within-group changes in the occupational mix of new immigrants to the US as a quasi-
natural experiment, and exploits variation in parental age at arrival to account for the
transmission of skills within the family. I find evidence of a significant 'ethnic capital'
effect, which contributes notably to the persistence of skill differentials across individuals
over time. The results also suggest that geographic concentration and endogamy rates
accentuate the effect of ethnic capital by promoting a higher level of interaction among
individuals in a given ethnic group.
The second chapter examines the negative relationship between fertility and education.
Using information on compulsory attendance and child labor laws that affected women's
schooling choices in their teenage years, I identify the effect of education on total
completed fertility accounting for the endogeneity of schooling, and find that women
with 3-4 additional years of schooling have on average one less child than they would
have otherwise. Moreover, while there is evidence that education increases childlessness,
this fertility-reducing effect of education does not appear to be mediated by a reduction in
marriage rates. The results also imply that rising levels of education account for a sizable
fraction of the recent fertility declines observed in several Western countries.
Finally, the third chapter evaluates the labor market effects of public subsidies to families
with children. Using variation in the level of benefits provided by a policy reform in the
UK that affected differentially what would otherwise be comparable groups of families, I
estimate the effect of family allowances (also known as child benefits) on female labor
force participation. The results show evidence of negative, yet insignificant and
quantitatively negligible, effects of family allowances on female labor force participation.
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1. Introduction
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays in population and family economics.
The first chapter studies ethnic peer effects in the intergenerational transmission of skills.
The human capital of individuals appears to be correlated with ethnic group averages in
the previous generation, even after controlling for the direct effect of parental investment
in the human capital of children. This observed association is often interpreted as
evidence for ethnic peer effects, but it might be confounded by omitted variables and
measurement error in parental skills. In order to determine whether, and to what extent,
this relationship is caused by ethnic peer effects, I develop the following instrumental
variables strategy: (1) the occupational mix of new immigrant arrivals during the Great
Migration is used to instrument for ethnic capital, and (2) age at arrival is used to
instrument for parental skills. Using 1910 and 1920 US Census data on first- and second-
generation Americans, I find evidence of a significant ethnic capital effect, confirming
that the persistence of skill differentials across individuals is partly attributable to their
belonging to particular ethnic groups through a channel independent of their respective
parents' skills. As expected, the results indicate that OLS estimates significantly
understate the role of parental skills and slightly overstate the magnitude of ethnic peer
effects, which is consistent with the motivation for using instrumental variables. Finally,
a number of specification checks support the notion that geographic concentration and
endogamy rates accentuate the effect of ethnic capital by promoting a higher level of
interaction among individuals in a given ethnic group.
The second chapter examines the effect of schooling on fertility. Social scientists have
long observed a strong negative relationship between education and the number of
children per woman. The question of whether this correlation is causal remains open,
however, since the choice of schooling is not random. In this chapter, I use 1950-1990
Census data, along with information on compulsory attendance and child labor laws that
affected women's schooling choices in their teenage years, to estimate the effect of
education on total completed fertility accounting for the endogeneity of schooling.
Instrumental variable estimates using changes in state compulsory schooling laws as a
source of exogenous variation in education suggest that women with 3-4 additional years
9
of schooling have on average one less child than they would have otherwise.
Furthermore, this fertility-reducing effect of schooling does not appear to be mediated by
a reduction in marriage rates, while there is evidence that education does increase the
probability that a woman will reach the end of her fertile lifetime without children. These
results are robust to a number of specification checks, and imply that rising levels of
education can account for a sizable fraction of the decline in fertility rates for several
Western countries in the second half of the 2 0th century.
Finally, the third chapter evaluates the labor market effects of public subsidies to families
with children. The use of policies that reduce the cost of child care to the family is seen
as a means to simultaneously encourage fertility and a strong attachment of women to the
labor market. These programs include child care subsidies, which have been extensively
studied in the literature, and family allowances, whose consequences in terms of labor
market outcomes have been mostly ignored. Unlike child care subsidies, family
allowances are a universal cash payment to parents based on the presence and number of
children. In the absence of 'flypaper effects', these allowances amount to an increase in
the household's unearned income, so they involve a pure positive income effect which
might act as a disincentive to female labor force participation, as is shown using a simple
model of market work, fertility and the home production of child care. I then use data
from the 1998, 1999 and 2000 waves of the British Household Panel to analyze the
impact of family allowances on female participation. Exogenous variation in the level of
benefits is provided by a policy reform in the UK that affected differentially what would
otherwise be comparable groups of families. Fixed-Effects 2SLS estimates show
evidence of negative, yet insignificant and quantitatively negligible, effects of family
allowances on female labor force participation.
10
1. Does 'Ethnic Capital' Matter? Identifying Peer Effects in the
Intergenerational Transmission of Ethnic Differentials
1.1. Introduction
Differences in socioeconomic outcomes across ethnic groups tend to persist over time.
The variation observed in one generation does not completely disappear in the next. A
significant part of those disparities is transmitted across cohorts, thus slowing down the
process of ethnic convergence that one could expect from simple mean reversion. Table
1.1 illustrates how much of the ethnic differences in education that existed among US
immigrants in 1910 persisted into the second generation, for several national origin
groups. For instance, Scottish male immigrants aged 30 to 50 were 35.6 percentage points
more likely to be literate than Italian immigrants in 1910, and those in turn were 17.4
points more likely to be literate than Mexican immigrants. School enrollment rates of
second-generation Scots aged 6 to 18 in 1910 were 8.2 percentage points above those of
Italians, which were in turn 28.4 points above the attendance rate for Mexicans. Thirty
years later, there existed substantial differences in educational attainment among second-
generation adults in those same groups: average years of schooling in 1940 were 10.1 for
Scottish-Americans, 8.7 for Italian-Americans and only 4.1 for Mexican-Americans.
Their children also had noticeably different school attendance rates: a third-generation
Scottish-American of schooling age was 6 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in
school than a third-generation Italian-American child, who was, in turn, 12.1 points more
likely to be attending school than a third generation Mexican-American.
The persistence in ethnic differentials over time could simply be the result of the
transmission of skills that takes place within the family. Parents can influence the
socioeconomic development of their offspring by investing time, effort, and financial
resources in their children's human capital.1 Other individuals in their ethnic group,
however, can influence children as well. Friends, relatives, and neighbors can also serve
as role models, spend time helping with school homework, and transmit certain attitudes
towards education and work. Hence, being exposed to an advantageous ethnic
'While acknowledging that the genetic transmission of ability can also be an important channel, it is not
the subject of interest in this paper to determine whether the passage of parental skills to children can
mostly be attributed to nurture or not.
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environment while growing up can also contribute to the children's human capital
accumulation process, beyond the direct role of their parents. The existence of peer
effects in the ethnic group will then exacerbate the extent to which the skill level in the
immigrant generation determines the socioeconomic success of the next generation. That,
in turn, will have implications for overall inequality in the economy.
Following the predominant terminology in the literature, as introduced in Borjas
(1992), I will refer to these ethnic peer effects as the 'ethnic capital' effect in the
intergenerational transmission of skills. 'Ethnic capital' denotes the average in the ethnic
group of some measure of skills or socioeconomic performance -as opposed to 'parental
capital', which designates the corresponding measure for a given individual's parents.
While this ethnic spillover may operate primarily through geographic concentrations of
peers in the same ethnic group, ethnic capital effects are not to be confused with
neighborhood effects. Even within a neighborhood, children are more likely to befriend
and interact with other individuals in the same ethnic group,2 in which case the impact of
peers of the same ethnicity will outweigh that of neighbors in other groups.
The main challenge in disentangling the two channels of intergenerational
transmission of skills, and therefore estimating the parental and ethnic capital effects
separately, is identification. Despite the potential importance of this question for
immigration and welfare policy, most studies to date have relied primarily on ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression strategies to study ethnic spillovers in the transmission of
skills across generations. As I argue below, however, parental skills and average skill
levels in the ethnic group may be correlated for a number of reasons, so an observed
association between ethnic capital and child outcomes is not necessarily causal. To solve
this problem, I use instrumental variables (IV) to estimate both parental and ethnic capital
effects consistently.
My identification strategy exploits variations in the occupational mix of new
immigrant flows over time and across ethnic groups, much in the same way as Angrist
(2002) did for the effect of changing sex ratios. The instruments for average ethnic skills
are derived from official records of immigrant arrivals by year and national origin, further
2 Alba (1992) showed this for second-, third- and higher generation children in several Caucasian
European-American ethnic groups.
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classified into broad occupation groups. Occupational mix of new immigrants is assumed
to be exogenous to local economic conditions in the US, and therefore solves the
endogeneity problem caused by ethnicity-year specific shocks encouraging further skill
accumulation. The inclusion of ethnicity and year main effects and of individual
characteristics as control variables ensures that my results are robust to group-specific
characteristics that might be correlated with transferable skills of fathers and with the
occupational mix of new immigrants, such as tastes for work or education. This strategy
would fail, however, in the presence of time-ethnicity specific shocks that affected both
transferable skills of fathers and occupational mix of recent arrivals and that were not
fully captured by the covariates in my regressions. Such a situation appears unlikely,
though, particularly since the results appear robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables and to several other specification checks, thus weighing in in favor of a causal
interpretation.
I also instrument for a second key endogenous regressor, parental skills (measured
by father's literacy), with father's age at arrival interacted with a dummy variable for
non-English speaking country of birth, as in Bleakley and Chin (2003). The inclusion of a
father's age-at-arrival main effect controls for additional (non-literacy related)
unobserved dimensions of skills that may be transmitted from parents to children.
In order to clarify this idea, consider, for example, the children of Italian-
American immigrants in the US at the beginning of the 20th century. My strategy relates
changes in school attendance rates of second-generation Italian-American children
between 1910 and 1920 to changes in the fraction of recently arrived Italian immigrants
who were recorded as having low-skilled occupations (agricultural workers, laborers and
servants). The 'experiment' behind this approach consists, then, in observing how distinct
communities of immigrants will be affected by the arrival of newcomers with a different
level of skills. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence of incumbent immigrant groups at
various points in time being alarmed by the arrival of what they perceived to be 'lower
quality' immigrants in their ethnic groups.3 The existence of ethnic capital effects would
3 For instance, Thomas Sowell (1981, pp. 107-108) notes that "the relationship between the earlier arriving
members of a group and those arriving later is an important factor in the history of most American ethnic
groups. (...) The earlier Italian immigrants had gained a measure of acceptance and prosperity by the time
the massive waves of southern Italians arrived. (...) The northern Italians openly repudiated the southern
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provide some basis for the fear that new low-skilled waves of immigrants could dilute the
skills of the community and have a negative impact on the next generation as well.
This strategy constitutes a good natural experiment because, as I will argue below,
the resulting variation in the average skills by ethnicity was driven mainly by home
country conditions in the early twentieth century (most notably World War I), which
were exogenous to local US market conditions facing the existing immigrants and their
children. Moreover, social interactions among individuals within each of the ethnic
groups used in this analysis were indeed more important than with individuals outside the
group, as evidenced by the high intra-group marriage rates that will be presented below.
Finally, the immigrants (and immigrant flows) studied in this analysis constitute a major
demographic episode in American history, with aliens arriving in numbers that went
unmatched for almost a century. 4
An additional contribution of this paper is the use of measures of ethnic capital
that are contemporaneous with child outcomes (as opposed to using skills of immigrants
in a previous period), to better reflect the actual environment facing children and reduce
the potential bias from return migration in the measure of average skills in the ethnic
group. Another improvement is the use of repeated cross sections, which allows me to
control for ethnicity and year main effects.
The variables of interest in this research are human capital outcomes such as a
proxy for literacy in English for adults and school attendance for children. Both are
relevant education measures in the period being studied. Using micro data from the 1910
and 1920 US Censuses, I find evidence of significant ethnic capital effects in the
intergenerational transmission of skills. The IV estimates are slightly, though not
Italians. Many even preferred to pass for Americans." Irving Howe (1976, p229) remarks that "by the turn
of the [2 0 th] century, the tensions between the established German Jews and the insecure East European
Jews had become severe -indeed, rather nasty. (...) The Germans found it hard to understand what could
better serve their ill-mannered cousins than rapid lessons in civics, English, and the uses of soap." In both
cases, however, the newcomers did interact with the existing communities, as evidenced by the high
marriage rates within each group. Common culture, language or history could help explain why, for
example, "German Jews established and financed schools, libraries, hospitals, and community centers to
aid, and especially to Americanize, the eastern European Jewish immigrants." (Sowell, p.81).
4 Borjas (1994) refers to the huge flow of immigrants between 1880 and 1924 as the First Great Migration,
to distinguish it from the Second Great Migration that took place in the last twenty years of the twentieth
century: the number of immigrants admitted to the United States in the decade 1901-1910 is recorded at 8.8
million (Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)), which was only exceeded nine decades later (more than 9 million
legal immigrants are estimated to have arrived between 1991 and 2000), when the population of the US
was much larger.
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significantly, lower than the OLS estimates, which are subject to omitted variables bias
and attenuation bias. IV estimates of the direct parental effect are much higher than the
OLS estimates, suggesting severe measurement error in father's skills (the literacy
variable). The results also suggest that ethnic spillovers are stronger where the
geographic concentration of immigrants is highest. This result is consistent with ethnic
peer effects that operate, at least in part, through neighborhood effects. Finally,
regressions that take into account differences in endogamy rates by region also indicate
that peer effects are larger for more endogamous communities, while insignificant for
ethnic groups in regions where endogamy is very low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a theoretical
model of ethnic peer effects, develops the estimation framework, and highlights the
econometric issues involved in attempting to disentangle parental from ethnic peer effects
in the intergenerational transmission of skills. Section III describes the data and presents
the base empirical results. Section IV discusses some robustness checks and additional
results. Section V summarizes the paper and concludes.
1.2. Background
1.2.1.. Theoretical Framework
The idea that ethnic skills are transmitted across generations can be rationalized
by Borjas' (1992) 'ethnic capital' model, a theory of human capital externalities. Similar
ideas appear in the sociology literature on 'social capital': Loury (1977) first introduced
this term to explain how race differences in earnings persist over time due to spillover
effects within a racial group; Coleman (1988) later developed that concept and applied it
to the study of peer effects in the academic performance of high school students.5
In this framework, utility-maximizing parents invest in the human capital of their
children, while ethnic human capital has an external effect on the production of children's
human capital. 6 This last assumption is meant to capture the influence that other adults in
the ethnic group outside the immediate family have on the education of the next
5 More recently, Putnam (1995) introduced the notion of 'social capital' in the political discussion of the
decreasing participation in civic organizations in the US.
6 In Loury's terms, the opportunities of young people to acquire skills depend both on "the quality of home
environment" as well as "the quality of the community environment." (Loury, 1977, p. 159).
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generation. Other things equal, interaction with peers and exposure to the cultural norms
and values (and to examples of rewarding work and achievement) that are characteristic
of a particular ethnic group affect a child's human capital accumulation process. A more
recent application of this idea can be found in Lundberg and Startz (1998), who use a
similar model to explain the persistence of the racial wage gap.
Denote parents' human capital stock by ht, a child's human capital stock by h,+,
and the parents' own consumption by Ct. The household maximizes its welfare,
U = U(h,+,, C,) = [lhtP+l + 2Ctp }/, (1-1)
subject to a budget constraint,
C, < R( -s,)h,, (1-2)
and the production function for children's human capital is,
ht+ = ha hP2, (1-3)
where st is the fraction of h, devoted to the production of h,+,, h, is the average human
capital in the parents' peer group, and R is the market price of human capital stock
relative to consumption goods. The model is, therefore, characterized by dynamic
externalities, in the sense that the human capital of one generation contributes to the
production of the next generation's human capital. The model is solved by a supply
function of time allocated to investing in children's human capital: s, = f(h,, h,+ ). I take
a logarithmic transformation to obtain: 7
logh,+I = a + fl logh, + 21 loght (1-4)
The parameter 2, the coefficient on average human capital, represents a peer
group effect. This concept has been an object of considerable interest among economists:
Benabou (1993) analyzes how residential segregation concentrates low-skilled learners in
schools, which affects the learning process and results in persistent and widening income
inequality. Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) investigate network effects in
welfare participation; Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), and Winston and
Zimmerman (2003) study peer effects in academic outcomes among college roommates;
7 It can also be shown that a logh,+/la logh < I iff f + 2 < 1 (condition for convergence of ethnic skill
differentials).
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while Hoxby (2000), and Angrist and Lang (2002) estimate peer effects in the classroom.
They do not always, however, provide convincing evidence. 8
In practice, of course, child outcomes are determined by many other factors beside
parental skills and peer effects. I therefore add a stochastic error term to (4), as well as a
vector of individual covariates zi that includes region effects, age, father's age, and other
demographic variables. Also, I adopt notation that reflects that (1) different individuals
belong to different ethnic groups and that the externality will take place at the ethnic peer
group level, and (2) individuals in my data are observed in different years. The resulting
equation then is:
Y 1 a = a x, + +x , +  , + z Z + E+t, (1-5)
where yui is an observable socio-economic outcome of child i in ethnic group j at time t
(such as school enrollment), xjt is a measure of skills of the father (of child i in ethnicityj
at time t), xj,is the average skills of individuals in the father's generation in ethnic group
j at time t, 34 and , are ethnicity and Census year effects, respectively, and Eit, is an
individual error component.9
1.2.2. Econometric Framework
The most important identification problem raised by equation (1-5) is omitted
variable bias from correlation between average skills in the ethnic group, xj,, and other
ethnicity-year effects contained in the residual term eit,. For example, if different ethnic
groups are not distributed proportionally across occupations, industries or geographic
areas, then an economic shock that increases opportunities relatively more for a given
ethnic group at some point in time will encourage accumulation of skills for adults in that
group, while at the same time increase the schooling of their children. Moreover, xj, is
8 To borrow Manski's (1993) terminology, the intergenerational transmission parameter ,2 in equation (1-4)
expresses an "contextual or exogenous effect," as opposed to an "endogenous social effect," which is the
case of the peer effects studied by Zimmerman, Sacerdote, or Hoxby.
9 When parental level of skills is not observed, it is possible to aggregate (5) and write:
Yit + = (, + + > i + Vii + Ejrt 
in which case it is only possible to recover (, + ,82), an 'intergenerational correlation coefficient', but not
the ethnic peer effect /2 separately from the parental effect I,.
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subject to measurement error and is affected by economically motivated return migration,
as well as by immigrant arrivals.
In order to solve these problems, the fraction of new immigrants of 'low skills' to
which different ethnic groups in different years were exposed is used to construct an
instrument forxj. Recent flows of 'low-skilled' immigrants are correlated with the
average skills in the ethnic group because those new immigrants (arrived in the 5 years
prior to the Census year) are least likely to have returned to their home countries, and
hence are not subject to economically motivated return migration that could bias the
estimates.
A related consideration is that ethnic variation in the immigrant flow to the United
States during this period was mainly driven by home country conditions (political
instability, persecution), and hence the skill composition of that flow is unlikely to be the
response to local economic conditions in the US. For example, the ethnic and skill mix of
immigrants in 1920 were driven in large part by World War I, which made departure
from combatant countries more difficult, particularly for individuals in low-wage
occupations. Then, changes in the fraction of low-skilled immigrants arrived in 1915-
1919 relative to that fraction in 1905-1909 constitute a largely exogenous source of
variation in the difference between the average skills of adults in each ethnic group in
1920 relative to 1910. This is similar to the reasoning behind Angrist's (2002) study of
the effects of sex ratios on marriage rates and labor market outcomes. 10
Although omitted variables bias is the main motivation for my IV strategy, it is
important to note that the OLS estimates of equation (1-5) may also be confounded by the
fact that one regressor, xjt, is in fact close to being an average of another regressor, xy. In
other words, the parents of children in my data are among the adults used to compute the
average measure of skills in that ethnic group.
Suppose initially that xj, was exactly the ethnic group mean of xiv, then OLS
estimates of the coefficient on xjt in equation (1-5) would be equivalent to the
augmented regression form of a Hausman (1978) specification test for the difference
10 The instrument in Angrist (2002) was constructed from the sex mix, not the occupation mix, of recorded
immigrant flows by ethnicity and year.
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between OLS and IV estimates of the coefficient on xy in a simple regression ofyi on xij
only, with ethnicity dummies serving as the instrument for xy.11 If OLS estimates differ
from the IV estimates in the bivariate regression for any reason (e.g., measurement error
in xij), then the estimated OLS coefficient on xjtin equation (1-5) would be nonzero
(positive, in the errors in variables case) even in the absence of ethnic peer effects. This
problem is common to a broad class of empirical exercises where an outcome variable is
affected by both an average and an individual level variable, and appears in the
estimation of human capital externalities (Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)).
The situation here is somewhat more complicated since xj, is not the exact
average of xy in the sample.'2 Nevertheless, I show in Appendix A that under similar
circumstances the estimate of,8 2 will be non-zero even if the actual ethnic capital effect is
zero. This problem is solved by treating both xy and x,, as endogenous in (5).
To construct instruments for xu1, I use father's age at arrival, interacted with a
non-English speaking country of birth dummy, as an instrument for xy. Proficiency in the
dominant language of the receiving country is a particularly important component of an
immigrant's work-related human capital. Because languages are easier to learn at an
earlier age, an immigrant who arrived as a child from a non-English speaking country
should have developed better English-language skills than one who arrived as an adult. In
several studies of immigrants' language skills and earnings in Australia, Canada, Israel
and the US, Chiswick and Miller (1992, 1995) and Miller and Chiswick (2002) report
that, holding observable characteristics constant, language proficiency increases with
years in the receiving country and is lower when immigrants have migrated at older ages.
Research on cognitive science has established that the age of acquisition of a first or
second language is a major determinant of ultimate proficiency (Newport (1990), Flege,
Munro and MacKay (1995)). 13
1 1 See Davidson and MacKinnon (1989) for a detailed derivation of the equivalence between the Hausman
specification test and its augmented (or 'artificial') regression form.
12 The average x;, also includes the foreign born who do not have children, as well as all second
generation adults of working age,
This is usually linked to the fact that puberty is associated with a biological reduction in the plasticity of
the neural circuits that determine language learning ability (Lenneberg (1967), Flege, Yeni-Komshian and
Liu (1999)).
19
Since immigrants originating in English-speaking countries do not face a new
language upon arrival to the US, these effectively serve as a control. With my strategy,
only differences in outcomes between, say, two children of the same age whose
respective fathers immigrated from Germany at different ages, net of differences in
outcomes for comparable children whose fathers arrived from England at parallel ages,
are attributed to parental capital. A similar strategy was used in Bleakley and Chin (2003)
to study the returns to English proficiency for US immigrants.
1.2.3. Previous Research on Ethnic Peer Effects
Most empirical research on ethnic peer effects to date looks at the
intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic outcomes such as schooling and
earnings. One of the earliest empirical studies is Borjas' (1992) analysis of 1970s and
1980s General Social Surveys and National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth data. He
regressed education and log wages of second-generation individuals on the education of
their fathers, and on the average of parents in the ethnic group, and found that ethnic
capital plays as important a role as the father's skills in determining the human capital of
the next generation. In essence, he estimated an equation similar to (5) and interpreted the
OLS coefficients as the causal effects of parental and ethnic capital. Borjas (1995)
improves upon the previous study in addressing the potential problems introduced by
measurement error in xi, by using sibling's reports of parental skills as instruments, but
still treats the level of skills in the ethnic group as exogenous and is therefore subject to
omitted variable bias, as described in the previous section. 14
A related set of papers seeks to estimate the intergenerational transmission
parameter describing how the mean skills of the ethnic group change over time. Borjas
(1993), using 1940 and 1970 Census data, Borjas (1994), using 1910, 1940 and 1980
Census data, and Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000), using the 1940 and 1970 Censuses
along with the 1994-96 CPS, all found intergenerational correlations of education and
earnings in the range of 0.4 to 0.6. While this is an interesting question in and of itself,
14 Borjas also uses sibling's reported ethnicity as an instrument for ethnic capital. While that strategy
corrects for measurement error in the assignment of the individual to an ethnic background, it does not
address the potential omitted variables problem (from return migration or ethnicity-specific shocks, as
explained above) that contaminates the measured level of ethnic capital in each group.
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the exclusion of father's skills in the regressions makes it impossible to disentangle the
ethnic peer effect from the direct transmission of skills within the family.
One additional caveat that applies to most of these studies is the fact that the
measure of ethnic capital is generally constructed as the average skills in the parents
generation thirty years prior (when many of the individuals observed in the next
generation had not even been born yet). The resulting estimates may be especially prone
to bias from measurement error and economically motivated return migration. My
strategy uses characteristics of the ethnic group actually faced by the children of
immigrants when growing up.
1.3. Data and Main Results
1.3.1. Data Sources
The data used here comes from the 1910 and 1920 Census IPUMS files
(documented in Ruggles and Sobek, 1997). Because information on the skills of parents
is only available for the subsample of persons who still reside with their parents, which is
unlikely to be a representative subsample of adults, I restrict my analysis to an extract of
second-generation children of schooling age (6 to 18 years old) and their parents. For the
construction of measures of average skills by ethnic group, I use an extract of foreign-
born and second-generation adults of working age (19 to 65 years old). The 1910 and
1920 Censuses contain detailed information on the age at arrival of immigrants, essential
for the construction of one of my instruments, and on father's and mother's country of
birth and mother tongue. The latter are used to classify ethnic groups in a manner similar
to that used in administrative data (Ferneczi and Willcox, (1929)) used to form the
instruments. This results in twenty-six groups, plus an additional not elsewhere classified
group. (See Appendix B for details on the coding scheme).
The outcome variable of interest is school attendance, the only education variable
available for children but also perhaps the most relevant schooling measure in the early
20th century. 15 Skills of parents and average skills in the ethnic group are measured using
a proxy for literacy in English. Literacy in English is represented by a dummy variable
15 Those are the years before the 'high school movement' had made attendance to secondary schooling
more widespread (Goldin (1998)).
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that equals one if an individual indicates he or she can read and write in some language
and he or she can speak English. This way I aim to capture an informative dimension of
human capital that is presumably valued in the labor market. As argued in the previous
section, language proficiency is an important component of immigrants' skills as valued
in the US labor market. The use of English literacy (henceforth referred to simply as
literacy) to define ethnic capital facilitates the use of age at entry as an instrument for
parental capital.
Table 1.2 gives descriptive statistics for the extract. While the distribution across
regions and the average age of children and fathers remains fairly stable between 1910
and 1920, the fraction of second generation children attending school increases by about
3 percentage points, while the average literacy rate of immigrant fathers decreases
slightly by almost 2 points. On the other hand, the average literacy of all first and second
generation working age adults (my measure of ethnic capital) is higher in 1920 than in
1910, likely as a result of the higher average age (one and a half years older on average),
the progressive accumulation of skills by previous immigrants and the higher proportion
of second generation individuals over time. Finally, the high (relative to its time) fraction
living in a metropolitan area reflects the fact that immigrants are disproportionately more
likely to settle in urban areas than natives.
The existence of ethnic peer effects is the result of exposure to other individuals
in the group who act as role models and have an influence on the skill acquisition of
children. One way to measure the degree of interaction among individuals in a given
community is by looking at endogamy rates. I use information on the nativity of spouses
of married first and second generation women in order to compute the probability of
marriage to an individual from the same (first or second generation) ethnic group,
conditional on being married. The importance of intra-ethnic marriage in the groups
defined in my sample is documented in Table 1.3, which reports the distribution of
husbands' ethnicity separately for foreign born and second generation women. Endogamy
rates are high for almost all groups even in the second generation, which suggests a
strong level of individual interaction within groups. Over 80 percent of Italian women in
the second generation married in the same group, and that percentage is even higher for
Jewish and Japanese daughters of immigrants. In English-speaking groups such as
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English/Welsh or Irish, these rates are lower, yet only half of English, and only a third of
Irish women of second generation have a native husband.'6 Table 1.3 therefore supports
the ethnic taxonomy used in this analysis.
The ethnicity and skill distribution of the foreign stock (first and second
generation individuals) are described in Table 1.4. There is a good deal of heterogeneity
across ethnic groups and over time both in adult literacy and in children's school
enrollment rates. This variability is more clearly reflected in Figure 1, which plots school
attendance of second generation children against the average literacy rate of first and
second generation adults for all 54 ethnicity-year cells. The figure shows that higher
average literacy rates are associated with higher school enrollment rates for children.
Next I will turn to regression analysis in order to control for individual characteristics as
well as ethnicity and year effects, and then to use instrumental variables to identify what
part of this observed relationship is caused by ethnic peer effects.
1.3.2. OLS Estimates
The estimating equation for second-generation individual i, in ethnic group j,
observed in Census year t is (5), derived in the previous section. The first stage equations
relate the endogenous regressors to the instruments ayt, father's age at arrival interacted
with a dummy for non-English speaking country of birth, and fj,, the fraction of 'low-
skilled' immigrants (laborers, servants and agricultural workers) arrived in the five years
prior to the Census year:
Xi = + Plla + t + + + Z Y + plft j -l Zy , and (1-6)
Xjt = 2 + P21aiit + P22 f jt + 2j + t + i2 + 62ijt . (1-7)
This system is just-identified. The covariates zi include region effects, age, father's age,
and other demographics. Note that I also include a father's age-at-arrival main effect in
the equation of interest. Even though the immigration decision of the father is previous to
the birth of the child in my sample, and therefore could be thought of as exogenous to
children's outcomes, the timing of the father's arrival to the US may be correlated with
16 Moreover, breaking down the 'married other group' column would show that, in almost all cases, the
endogamy rate for second generation women is still above the fraction of women who married in any other
single group.
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unobserved parental characteristics such as ambition and drive, which may then be
transmitted to the next generation. I allow father's age at arrival to enter the equation and
directly affect schooling of children.
Table 1.5 reports OLS estimates of equation (1-5). These suggest that parents'
literacy has a modest but precisely measured effect on school attendance of children,
while the average literacy in the ethnic group has a relatively large and significant
impact.' 7 While region of residence and metropolitan area do not appear to affect the
estimates for parental capital, the ethnic peer effect declines notably (from 0.215 in
column (1) to 0.135 in column(4)) after including other controls such as age, father's age,
number of siblings, and father's age at arrival. According to these results, two
comparable children who only differ in the literacy of their fathers are predicted to have a
difference in the probability of attending school of about 5 percentage points. Two
observationally equivalent children with equally skilled parents but belonging to ethnic
groups that differ in their literacy rates by 30 percentage points are predicted to differ in
their respective probabilities of school attendance by just over 4 percentage points.
Column 5 experiments with using an average of father's and mother's literacy, to
account for the role of both parents in the transmission of skills.'8 The results are
comparable to those in the previous columns: even though ethnic spillovers are estimated
to be slightly lower, they still amount to twice the parental effect.
The estimates in this table are not readily comparable to other estimates in the
literature. They are most relatable to Sacerdote (2003), who in his analysis of the
transmission of human capital between former slaves and their children and
grandchildren reports that having a mother who was born a slave decreases the
probability of being enrolled in school by 12 percent, and to Weir (2000), who reports
positive effects of parents' years of schooling on school enrollment of children. I am not
aware, however, of any studies of the intergenerational correlation between immigrant
parents and second-generation children that have looked at school enrollment as an
outcome variable.
17 Standard errors in all regressions are corrected for ethnicity-year clustering.
18 The literature usually finds similar results when child outcomes are correlated with mother's
characteristics (Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000)).
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As noted in the previous section, OLS estimates of ethnic capital effects are
subject to upward bias from measurement error in father's skills. In that case, not only
does the measurement error attenuate the coefficient on parental capital, but it can also
create a false impression of positive ethnic peer effects. To illustrate the implications of
an inconsistent estimate of parental effects for the identification of ethnic effects, I
estimated equation (1-5) imposing different plausible values for ,l8. As reported in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.6, the estimated peer effect is 0.144 when father's literacy is
excluded from the equation, but falls to 0.106 when the parental effect is set to 0.20. On
the other hand, changing the constrained value of the ethnic spillover does not have much
impact on the estimated parental effect. These results support the notion that
measurement error in parental skills can bias the estimation of ethnic peer effects, and
therefore it is fundamental to estimate ,B consistently in order to identify f2.
The first-stage estimates for father's literacy rate (from estimating equation 6) are
displayed in Table 1.7. There is a strong, negative relationship between the instrument aijt
and parental skills. Regardless of the controls used, the estimate implies that delaying
arrival from a non-English speaking country to the US by three years leads to a two
percentage point decline in the probability of speaking English and being literate.' 9 Table
1.8 reports a set of first-stage estimates for average literacy. Even though the instrument
is later used in a micro regression on tens of thousands of observations, it is insightful to
estimate equation (1-7) at the aggregate level, controlling for ethnicity and year main
effects only, given that both the endogenous regressor ( j,) and the instrument (fj) do not
vary within ethnicity-year cells. Column 1 shows that the fraction of low-skilled recent
arrivals does have a large, significantly negative effect on average literacy rates even at
the macro level, on only 54 observations corresponding to the ethnicity-year cells. The
point estimate reveals that a 10 percentage point rise in the fraction of new immigrants
with low skills in a given ethnic group leads to a 6 percentage point decline in average
literacy rates in that group. This negative relationship is illustrated in Figure 2, which
19 These results are not directly comparable to those in Bleakley and Chin (2003). The English proficiency
variable in the 1990 Census, which they use in their estimations, is coded into four different categories,
whereas my measure of skills is a binary variable. It is also worth pointing out that I experimented with the
non-linear function of age at arrival that Bleakley and Chin use in their definition of the instrument au,, and
obtained very similar results. The non-linearity likely becomes important only in distinguishing between
subtle differences in language proficiency, but does not matter in predicting my binary skill indicator.
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plots literacy rates and fractions of low-skilled recent immigrants, net of ethnicity and
year. Columns 2 through 5 confirm that the estimate is robust to the inclusion of controls
at the micro level. Interestingly, neither aujt comes in significantly in equation (1-6) nor
does fj, in equation (1-7), confirming that each instrument is a strong predictor only of
one endogenous variable, along the lines of the discussion on the identification strategy
outlined above.
1.3.3. IVEstimates
The 2SLS estimates of equation (1-5) are reported in Table 1.9. The coefficient on
father's literacy after adding all the controls, as shown in column 3, is clearly higher than
its OLS counterpart. The results indicate that, other things equal, having a literate father
increases the probability that a child is enrolled in school by 20 percentage points. The
OLS estimate from Table 1.5 appears to be downward biased, which is consistent with
measurement error in the measure of parental skills. At the same time, models that treat
the average skills in the ethnic group as endogenous generate a 2SLS estimate of 0.116
for the effect of ethnic capital on the probability that children are in school. It appears
that most of the positive association observed in Table 1.5 and Figure 2 is indeed causal.
The point estimates for ethnic spillovers are, however, slightly lower than the OLS ones,
which is coherent with the omitted variables bias story whereby some ethnic groups
experience positive shocks that encourage further skill accumulation and result in both
higher literacy levels of adults and higher school enrollment rates of children. This
difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates of ethnic peer effects is, nevertheless,
not significant. Using mean skills of both parents yields slightly lower but less precise
estimates (due mostly to reduced sample size). In any case, the pattern of the estimates
relative to their OLS counterparts is in line with that of all other columns, reinforcing the
idea that measurement error in parental skills is a severe problem.
Table 1.10 performs the same experiment as in Table 1.6, now using instrumental
variables to estimate the unconstrained coefficient. As before, the coefficient on ethnic
capital shrinks when the parental effect is larger. When the latter is set to 0.20,
approximately the 2SLS result from the previous table, the estimated ethnic spillover
becomes equal to the unconstrained 2SLS result. This provides further proof that
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consistent estimation of one endogenous regressor is key to the correct identification of
the other.
1.3.4. Additional Results and Specification Checks
I turn now to addressing the concern that my results are affected by the multi-
dimensional nature of human capital. Suppose that the skill that is transmitted from one
generation to the next is not a single factor, but instead comprises two different
components, xi and x2: xit = xiU, + x2u. Only one component, xl (literacy), is observable.
In that case, the estimating equation (1-5) becomes:
Y, = a+Axn , + fl2,, + + Zi + z, + (e + x2 + 2X2j). (1-8)
Since only xl can be included in the regression, the residual contains x2 and X2 20. Given
that fj, my instrument for (observed) ethnic capital is based on the occupational mix of
new immigrants, it may be picking up some unobservable dimensions of skills that are
not included in literacy. In that case, f is correlated with x2 and hence with the residual,
thus yielding inconsistent estimates. Including father's occupation in the regression,
however, should control for that additional component of transferable skills not contained
in the observed x. The first two columns in Table 1.11 report OLS and 2SLS models
that include a dummy variable that equals one if the father is a laborer, a servant or an
agricultural worker (the same criterion used to construct the instrument ). If unobserved
skills correlated with f rendered my instrumental variable strategy invalid, then these
estimates should be different from those that do not include a proxy for unobserved skills.
There is, however, no evidence that the inclusion of father's occupation alters the
estimates in any way. These results therefore strengthen the case for interpreting the
2SLS estimate as the causal effect of ethnic capital, as measured by average literacy, on
school attendance of children.
Finally, columns 3 and 4 in Table 1.11 deal with the possibility that imprecise
estimation of averages for small ethnic groups may be biasing my estimates. For that
purpose, I re-estimate equation (1-5) after excluding observations belonging to the
following groups: African, Spanish, Romanian, Armenian and Ruthenian (the five
20 To the extent that different components of skills may be correlated, that alone creates an additional
source of bias for OLS estimates of equation (1-9).
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smallest ethnic groups in my sample, as evidenced by the counts in Table 1.3). Again, my
findings also survive this robustness check.
1.4. Ethnic Capital Effects and Measures of Ethnic Concentration and
Interaction
The ethnic peer effects hypothesis has a number of implications that can be checked.
First, ethnicity is likely to play a more important role among individuals who grow up in
an environment with a higher concentration of people in their ethnic group. In regions
where one's ethnic group only represents a very small fraction of the population, children
will probably be exposed to, and influenced by, less frequent social and cultural
intragroup contacts. The analysis in the preceding section ignored this because it assumed
that the coefficient on ethnic capital was the same across individuals. In order to explore
whether ethnic clustering affects the magnitude of ethnic spillovers, I interact average
skills with a measure of concentration in the ethnic group. For each child in my sample, I
compute the proportion of working age adults in the region who share the same ethnic
background. A dummy variable indicating whether that fraction is above or below the
average across observations is interacted with both the parental capital variable and the
ethnic capital variable.21 Admittedly, a sharper exercise would compare individuals in
highly segregated neighborhoods against those in more homogeneous districts. The 1910
and 1920 Census data, however, does not include such detail of information on place of
residence, so I use Census region instead.2 2
The findings are summarized in Table 1.12. Column 1 reproduces the baseline
OLS estimates from column 4 in Table 1.5. Column 2 shows that the ethnic peer effect is
larger among persons who live in highly concentrated areas (0.261 versus 0.122 for
children in low concentration regions), even though the standard errors are too high to
claim the difference is statistically significant. The loss in precision occurs because not
21 The average fraction of the working age adult population in the same ethnic group as the child in my
sample is just under 12%. I therefore define my dummy variable for 'high' ('low') concentration as being
in a region with more (less) than 12% of adults in the same ethnic group. In order to compute that fraction,
I look at both first and second generation adults aged 19 to 65 (which are the most likely to interact with the
parents of the child).
I do not use state of residence, because the number of first and second generation adults of working age
by state in 1910 is too small and introduces too much sampling error in the measures of concentration.
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all ethnic groups are represented in both high and low concentration regions, and hence
estimation of each of the parental and capital effects no longer uses all ethnicity-year
cells. The last two columns repeat the same exercise for 2SLS. While column 3 shows the
benchmark 2SLS estimates from column 3 in Table 1.9, Column 4 reports the
coefficients separately for high and low concentration areas. Again, despite the loss in
precision, the coefficient on ethnic capital is higher where concentration is greater. These
results are suggestive that ethnic environment has a stronger impact on children in areas
where ethnic groups are more concentrated.
Another check on the peer effects story looks at differences in the magnitude of
the coefficient on ethnic capital as a function of a different measure of social interactions
within groups. As has been argued in Section II, endogamy rates provide a good measure
of the extent to which individuals in an ethnic group are in close contact to other people
in the group as opposed to people in other groups. Communities where most women
marry within their ethnic group are typically more cohesive and closed to outside
influences. On the other hand, children in those communities where a large proportion of
women marry outside their ethnic group are more likely to interact with neighbors or
relatives of different ethnicities, and should be less frequently exposed to the particular
role models and values associated with their own ethnic group. If that assumption is
correct, ethnic peer effects in more endogamous communities must be stronger than in
less endogamous groups.
To determine whether ethnic peer effects are associated with high endogamy
rates, I allow the coefficient on ethnic capital to vary according to the fraction of married
second-generation women in the region who wedded in the same ethnic group. I use
second generation women because endogamy rates for the first generation might simply
reflect the fact that many immigrants married before arrival to the US, whereas the
marriage decisions of their US-born children provide a more accurate measure of the
actual level of interaction among members of the same ethnic group.2 3
Table 1.13 reports regressions where father's literacy and average literacy in the
ethnic group are interacted with dummy variables indicating whether the endogamy rate
in the region was above or below 55 percent, which is roughly the average second-
23 Endogamy rates for second-generation women were presented in column 5 of Table 3.
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generation endogamy rate in the sample. OLS estimates in column (2) indicate that ethnic
capital externalities are larger in highly endogamous ethnic groups. This is further
confirmed by the 2SLS estimates in column (4). The estimated ethnic peer effect is
insignificant and very close to zero for those in low endogamy communities, and 0.140
for those in high endogamy groups.
Aside from providing further support to my ethnic group classification, these
results imply that ethnic spillovers operate mainly through the strength of the ethnic
social fabric, as measured by endogamy rates. There is evidence that as cultural and
socioeconomic assimilation takes place, cross-ethnicity marriage rates increase and
endogamy rates decline (Spickard (1989)). Those communities with both few
endogamous unions and low ethnic spillovers are thus likely to be more integrated in the
US. In such groups, then, exposure to ethnic role models and behavioral norms becomes
more infrequent, and the importance of ethnic capital in the transmission of skills across
generations diminishes.
1.5. Conclusions
Previous attempts to identify the link between average skills of immigrants and the
socioeconomic outcomes of their children have paid little attention to problems of
omitted variables bias and measurement error. My research underscores the potential
importance of endogenous ethnic and parental skills in intergenerational skill
transmission equations and of their sensitivity to the estimation procedure used in the
analysis.
Estimates using an exogenous source of variation in skills among immigrant
groups, while simultaneously instrumenting for the skills of parents to reduce attenuation
bias, provide strong evidence for the existence of ethnic capital effects, albeit not of a
stronger magnitude than the direct effect that parents have on their children. Moreover, a
number of specification checks support the notion that ethnic peer effects operate partly
through the geographic concentration of ethnic groups and the higher level of interaction
among individuals in those groups.
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The persistence of ethnic differentials across generations and over time has
relevant implications for welfare and immigration policy. While the outcome variable
studied here is school enrollment, the estimated ethnic capital effects have far-reaching
consequences. A lower probability that a child attends school implies reduced
opportunities for social mobility and ultimately translates into lower earnings. The
existence of ethnic peer effects in the human capital accumulation process of children has
long-lasting effects on inequality, and shows that incumbent ethnic communities are
correct to be concerned about the dilution of skills resulting from the arrival of new
immigrants to the group. On the other hand, it also indicates that government
interventions in the form of aid programs specifically targeted at particular ethnic groups
can be a very effective means to reduce inequality in the short and in the long run, for
that same reason.
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Appendix 1
A. 1. 1. Mathematical Appendix
This section attempts to develop more formally the point that a positive estimated
coefficient on ethnic capital can be obtained even in the absence of ethnic peer effects.
Consider a simplified version of equation (1-5), where /2 = 0 and all covariates have been
dropped or 'partialed out.' Moreover, assume that x is only a noisy measure of the true
parental skill variable, x*. The model then becomes:
Yi = /3,x + i (Al-l)
where xi = x/ + v;, the measurement error term v i has mean zero and variance a,, and
it satisfies E[vx] = E[vi ] = 0 (classical measurement error).
In addition to x, another variable w is available such that E[wix] aowx >0 and
E[wiei ] = 0. Without loss of generality, then, this new variable w is positively correlated
with parental skills. A regression that includes both x and w will yield:
Yi = 7tlx i + r2 Wi + i, (A1-2)
with:
plim7r2 = L[ 2 (1-A)(Al-3)
w2 2
where Y = E[w, and .= E[x2] (all variables are measured in deviations from their
means) and A = [ /(2 + a2 )], or the 'reliability ratio', a measure of the goodness of x
as a measure of x*. Since 0<2<1, the coefficient on w in this regression does not converge
to zero. In words, the introduction of an additional regressor that is correlated with the
mismeasured parental capital results in biased coefficients and the misleading appearance
that the new regressor 'belongs' in the equation, when in fact it is not present in the true
model (Al). The sign of the probability limit of 7r2 is that of the covariance between w
and x (positive). Of course, if no measurement error is present, then r2 is asymptotically
zero.
Ethnic capital is an example of such a regressor w. To be more precise, consider
wi = x + ri, where ri, has mean zero and variance U2, and E[ixi] - ax which does
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not necessarily equal zero. In that case, = ,, and a 2 + and 2 = + + 2, so
(A3) becomes:
plim.2=, l ('2 + x) (A1-4)
2 + T."' I ii+ ;, + ax,
When w does not vary within a group j, but only across groups (this is, when
WY- x+i), then ax,7 (intuitively: the covariance must be negative
because relatively high realizations of x* will require relatively low values of 1 in order
for all observations in group j to have the same value of w). Hence .2 = ,2 _ -a 2 and
therefore the coefficient will converge to:
plim 1-' -A 2 - (Al-5)
Since '2 < a2 the above formula is bounded between 0 and i.
The derivations above show that the OLS estimate of the coefficient on ethnic
capital (j) in equation (1-5) is inconsistent, because xi is some ethnicity-specific
summary measure of skills that is correlated with xij, even if it is not the exact average of
the fathers in the sample. One should then expect the coefficient to be positive even in the
absence of ethnic spillovers, just from the fact that the ethnic mean is correlated with the
true parental skills, which are observed with error.
Finally, note that in the particular case where xi is actually computed for each
ethnic group as the average of xij in the sample, then the term (2 / ' 2 ), or (o /'2 ), in
(A5) can be read as the R-squared of the first stage regression of x on a full set of
ethnicity dummies. The better the fit in that first stage (this is, the better ethnicity predicts
xij), the larger the bias, and the stronger the spurious 'ethnic capital effect' will appear to
be.
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A. 1.2. Data Appendix
Ferenczi and Willcox (1929) report administrative data on alien arrivals collected
by the United States immigration authorities. This source shows numbers of immigrants
admitted by year, broad occupation categories (agriculture, laborers and servants,
professionals, commerce and finance, industry, and miscellaneous), and "race or people."
Additional tables classify immigrants by "race or people" into their countries of origin,
which is the information I used to match the groups in the administrative data to the
ethnic groups I identified in the Census data. Every Census from 1880 to 1970 collected
information on country of birth that identifies the foreign born, and the foreign-birth
status of both parents. Moreover, the nativity variables were recoded in the IPUMS to
give a fairly consistent categorization for all years.
Classification of the foreign born (first generation) individuals in my sample into
ethnic groups was made using country of birth or a combination of country of birth and
mother tongue or race, in order to match the "race or people" categories in Ferenczi and
Willcox as closely as possible. The coding scheme was as follows. [When different, the
Ferenczi and Willcox categories appear in brackets].
1. African (Black): born in Africa or the West Indies, and of black race.
2. Armenian: born in the former Russian Empire/Soviet Union or the Middle East, with
Armenian as their mother tongue.
3. Bulgarian/Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian: born in Bulgaria or the former Yugoslavia, or
elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe with Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian or Slovene as their
mother tongue. ["Bulgarian, Serbian and Montenegrin," and "Croatian and Slovenian," in
Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)].
4. Czech: born in Bohemia or Moravia, or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe with
Czech (Bohemian or Moravian) as their mother tongue. ["Bohemian and Moravian," in
Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)].
5. Dutch/Flemish: born in the Netherlands, or in Belgium with Dutch (Flemish) as their
mother tongue.
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6. English/Welsh: born in England, Wales or British Canada, or in Canada with English
as their mother tongue.2 4
7. Finnish: born in Finland.
8. French/Canadian: born in French Canada (Quebec) or France, or in Canada,2 5 Belgium
or Switzerland with French as their mother tongue.
9. German/Austrian: born in German or Austria, or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe,
with German as their mother tongue ["German," in Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)].
10. Greek: born in Greece.
11. Hungarian: born in Central/Eastern Europe, with Hungarian/Magyar as their mother
tongue. ["Magyar," in Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)].
12. Irish: born in Ireland, or in British Canada with Irish as their mother tongue.
13. Italian: born in Italy.
14. Japanese: born in Japan.
15. Jewish: born in Central/Eastern Europe, with Yiddish as their mother tongue.
["Hebrew," in Ferenczi and Willcox (1929)].
16. Lithuanian: born in Lithuania or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe with Lithuanian
as their mother tongue.
17. Mexican: born in Mexico.
18. Polish: born in Poland or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe, with Polish as their
mother tongue.
19. Portuguese: born in Portugal, or in South America with Portuguese as their mother
tongue.
20. Romanian: born in Romania, or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe with Romanian
as their mother tongue.
21. Russian: born in the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, or elsewhere in Central/Eastern
Europe, with Russian as their mother tongue.
22. Ruthenian: born in Central/Eastern Europe with Ruthenian as their mother tongue.
23. Scandinavian: born in Norway, Iceland, Denmark or Sweden.
24 In 1910 all individuals born in Canada are given the same code for birthplace, hence the use of mother
tongue to distinguish English from French Canadians.
25 See previous footnote.
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24. Scottish: born in Scotland, or in British Canada with Scottish Gaelic as their mother
tongue.
25. Slovak: born in Slovakia, or elsewhere in Central/Eastern Europe with Slovak as their
mother tongue.
26. Spanish: born in Spain, or in South America with Spanish as their mother tongue.
27. NEC: Not Elsewhere Classified.
Ethnicity of the second generation was assigned as above, but using father's country of
birth and father's mother tongue, except for those with a foreign mother only, in which
case mother's country of birth and mother's mother tongue were used.26
26 I experimented with a definition of second generation based on the mother's country of birth and mother
tongue, and using the father's information for those with a foreign father only. The results were not
sensitive to the definition of the second generation.
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Table 1.1
Summary Education of Immigrants in 1910, of the Second-Generation in 1910 and 1940, and of
the Third Generation in 1940, by Ethnic Group
1910 1940
School Years of School
Literacy Attend. School. Attend.
Rate of Rate of of Rate of
First- Second- Second- Third-
Gener. Adults Gener. Kids Gener. Adult Gener. Kids
Ethnic Adults Sample Kids Sample Adults Sample Kids Sample
Group 30-50 Size 6-18 Size 30-50 Size 6-18 Size
African .754 49 .667 18 6.0 464 .853 526
Armenian .871 39 .875 8 9.7 7 .911 31
Bulg/Ser/Cro .699 216 .571 98 8.2 54 .890 321
Czech .928 225 .683 498 8.8 179 .881 462
Dutch/Flemis .944 143 .705 277 9.1 118 .856 424
English/Wels .989 1,008 .768 2,390 10.0 874 .887 1,630
Finnish .913 150 .692 124 8.8 113 .878 187
French/Cana .977 135 .670 823 9.0 429 .851 929
German/Aust .910 3,079 .690 5,307 8.9 2,940 .868 5,757
Greek .826 150 .571 14 11.0 14 .883 298
Hungarian .874 526 .673 165 9.4 125 .826 476
Irish .972 1,104 .753 1,954 9.7 1,242 .904 1,912
Italian .636 1,476 .677 1,348 8.7 902 .857 4,282
Japanese .775 223 .721 43 10.8 8 .935 130
Jewish .868 815 .771 1,153 10.8 472 .884 723
Lithuanian .719 164 .686 121 8.8 71 .863 279
Mexican .458 205 .393 201 4.1 134 .736 891
Polish .736 338 .594 1,188 8.3 685 .846 2,184
Portuguese .558 68 .702 114 7.5 50 .820 197
Romanian .810 58 .727 11 11.2 37 .866 178
Russian .748 721 .782 116 10.6 411 .882 1,791
Ruthenian .465 43 .686 35 7.2 8 .781 58
Scandinavian .985 1,385 .750 2,339 9.4 1,365 .896 2,402
Scottish .992 252 .759 399 10.1 252 .917 480
Slovak .814 250 .669 248 8.4 115 .889 219
Spanish .886 44 .552 30 9.2 20 .891 101
Native .910 28,031 .725 40,576 8.8 53,755 .841 60,395
Notes: The table shows the fraction of foreign-born men aged 30 to 50 who can read and write in any language in
1910, the fraction of second-generation children (i.e.: born in the US to a foreign-born parent) aged 6 to 18 who are
enrolled in school in 1910, the average years of schooling for second-generation men aged 30-50 in 1940, and the
fraction of third-generation children (i.e.: born in the US to a second-generation parent) who are enrolled in school in
1940. For comparison purposes, the last row shows the corresponding measures for third- and higher- generation
adults (this is, US-born adults with US-born parents), and for fourth- and higher-generation children (this is, US-born
children of US-parents and grandparents). Source: Author's tabulations from the 1910 and 1940 Census IPUMS files.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics for the 1910 and 1920 Census IPUMS samples
Variables 1910-1920 1910 1920
A. Children (Second-Generation Americans of Schooling Age)
Dependent Variable
In School
Age
Female
Number of Siblings
In Metropolitan Area
In Region:
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
N
.724
(.447)
Covariates
10.93
(3.98)
.496
(.500)
3.68
(2.12)
.611
(.487)
.123
(.328)
.335
(.472)
.244
(.430)
.150
(.357)
.020
(.141)
.008
(.087)
.032
(.175)
.030
(.170)
.058
(.233)
76,847
.709
(.454)
11.18
(4.00)
.493
(.500)
3.78
(2.10)
.567
(.496)
.121
(.326)
.296
(.457)
.260
(.439)
.180
(.384)
.018
(.133)
.008
(.088)
.034
(.181)
.029
(.169)
.054
(.226)
19,202
.737
(.440)
10.73
(3.95)
.498
(.500)
3.60
(2.12)
.648
(.477)
.125
(.330)
.368
(.482)
.231
(.421)
.125
(.331)
.022
(.148)
.007
(.085)
.030
(.171)
.030
(.171)
.061
(.240)
57,645
Notes: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920. In Panels A and B, the sample is restricted
to second-generation Americans (i.e.: born in the US to a foreign-born parent) of schooling age (6 to 18
years old) who reside with their parents. In Panel C, the sample is restricted to first- and second-generation
Americans (i.e.: foreign-born, or born in the US to a foreign-born parent) of working age (19 to 60 years
old). Standard deviations are in parentheses. All other entries are means (weighted by the IPUMS sample-
line weight).
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for the 1910 and 1920 Census IPUMS samples
Variables 1910-1920 1910 1920
B. Fathers (First-Generation Americans with Children of Schooling Age)
Regressor of Interest.' Parental Capital
Literacy
Age
Age at Arrival
N
.843
(.364)
Covariate
44.84
(8.46)
Instrument
20.61
(8.52)
76,847
.853
(.354)
45.35
(8.27)
20.75
(8.52)
19,202
.835
(.371)
44.42
(8.59)
20.49
(8.52)
57,645
C. Adults (First- and Second-Generation Americans of Working Age)
Regressor of Interest: Ethnic Capital
Literate .863
(.344)
.832
(.374)
.890
(.312)
Demographic Characteristics
Age
Fraction in Metropolitan Area
Low-Skilled New Immigrants
as Fraction of Population
New Immigrants
as Fraction of Population
N
36.71
(11.29)
.625
(.480)
Instrument
.043
(.106)
.082
(.148)
305,842
Notes: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920. In Panels A and B, the sample is restricted
to second-generation Americans of schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. In Panel
C, the sample is restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old).
Standard deviations are in parentheses. All other entries are means (weighted by the IPUMS sample-line
weight).
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35.67
(11.17)
.595
(.491)
.079
(.146)
.142
(.196)
81,649
37.09
(11.33)
.653
(.476)
.011
(.021)
.029
(.040)
224,193
-- -- -I I--
Table 1.3
Endogamy Rates in the First and Second Generation (1910-1920), by Ethnic Group
First-Generation Women Second-Generation Women
Married Married Married Married
Ethnic Married Same Other Married Same Other
Group Native Group Group Native Group Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
African (Black) 25.4 60.8 13.9 71.4 22.6 5.9
Armenian 1.0 97.9 1.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Bulg/Serb/Croa 0.2 95.8 4.0 18.0 64.1 18.0
Czech 2.6 87.5 9.9 13.6 61.1 25.3
Dutch/Flemish 6.0 83.6 10.5 27.0 45.8 27.3
English/Welsh 27.1 52.9 19.9 53.2 23.7 23.1
Finnish 0.8 92.3 6.9 10.5 62.7 26.9
French/Canadian 9.4 74.5 16.2 33.9 34.3 31.8
German/Austrian 7.2 82.9 9.9 31.0 52.3 16.6
Greek 0.4 95.5 4.1 14.3 57.1 28.6
Hungarian 0.8 87.2 12.1 11.8 41.2 47.1
Irish 11.2 71.3 17.5 33.9 39.3 26.9
Italian 0.2 98.9 0.8 7.6 82.4 10.0
Japanese 0.0 99.6 0.4 0.0 95.5 4.6
Jewish 0.2 97.8 2.0 2.8 84.2 13.0
Lithuanian 0.2 96.9 3.0 5.7 75.5 18.9
Mexican 4.2 93.5 2.3 11.7 82.8 5.5
Polish 0.5 94.3 5.3 6.4 76.1 17.5
Portuguese 1.7 95.1 3.2 14.5 64.0 21.5
Romanian 0.6 83.4 16.0 5.3 36.8 57.9
Russian 1.2 88.3 10.6 12.0 56.7 31.3
Ruthenian 0.0 88.9 11.1 0.0 71.4 28.6
Scandinavian 6.2 85.0 8.8 29.5 49.4 21.0
Scottish 20.3 47.4 32.4 51.5 9.8 38.7
Slovak 0.4 92.3 7.3 3.3 75.8 20.9
Spanish 7.1 80.1 12.8 26.7 36.0 37.3
NEC 8.0 74.1 18.0 40.2 24.0 35.8
Notes: The table shows the distribution of husband's ethnicity for married women in the 1910 and 1920
Censuses with spouse present in the household. Columns (1)-(3) show the ethnicity distribution of husbands
for foreign-born women, while columns (4)-(6) do the same for second-generation women. Columns (2) and
(5) refer to husbands, either first or second generation, of the same ethnic group as the wife. Columns (3) and
(6) refer to husbands, either first or second generation, of some ethnic group other than that of the wife.
Source: Author's tabulations from the 1910 and 1920 Census IPUMS files.
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Table 1.5
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills
Using average
of Father's and
Mother's
Using Father's Literacy Literacy
In School In School In School In School In School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Father's Literacy .054** .052** .051** .049** .060**
(Parental Capital) (.011) (.011) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Average Literacy .215** .214** .137** .135** .119**
(Ethnic Capital) (.034) (.035) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Region, Metro No Yes No Yes Yes
Effects?
Age Dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes
Father's Age and No No Yes Yes Yes
Age-Squared?
Female .002 .001 -.003
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Father's Age at -.0012** -.0011** -.0008**
Arrival (.0003) (.0002) (.0003)
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864 56,308
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy
rates are computed from a sample restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19
to 60 years old). All regressions include Census year and ethnicity main effects. In column 5, the sample is
restricted to children whose parents are both first-generation Americans and are both present in the
household. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in
a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.6
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills:
Additional Results
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
on Parental on Parental on Ethnic on Ethnic
Benchmark Capital =0 Capital =.2 Capital =.1 Capital =0
In School In School In School In School In School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Father's Literacy .049** .000 .200 .049** .048**
(Parental Capital) (.008) (.009) (.009)
Average Literacy .135** .144** .106** .100 .000
(Ethnic Capital) (.022) (.024) (.018)
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy
rates are computed from a sample restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19
to 60 years old). All regressions include Census year, ethnicity, region and female main effects as well as
father's age, father's age squared, father's age at arrival, number of siblings, a dummy indicating residence
in a metropolitan area, and a vector of age dummies. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance
at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.7
Age at Arrival from Non-English Speaking Country as Instrument for Parental Capital:
First-Stage Estimates
Average of
Father's and
Father's Father's Father's Father's Mother's
Literacy Literacy Literacy Literacy Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Father's Age at -.0065** -.0065** -.0066** -.0065** -.0053**
Arrival * Non- (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0017)
English Speaking
Country of Origin
Father's Age at -.0007** -.0008** -.0007** -.0007** -.0030**
Arrival (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0011)
Region, Metro No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Effects?
Age Dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes
Father's Age and No No Yes Yes Yes
Age-Squared,
Female Dummy, and
Number of Siblings?
Fraction of New -.058 -.119
Immigrants in Low- (.070) (.096)
Skilled Occupations
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864 56,308
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. All regressions include Census year and
ethnicity main effects. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of
confidence in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.8
Recent Immigrant Flows as Instrument for Ethnic Capital:
First-Stage Estimates
Average Average Average Average Average
Literacy Literacy Literacy Literacy Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction of New -.599** -.605** -.605** -.603** -.603**
Immigrants in Low- (.300) (. 197) (. 197) (. 197) (. 197)
Skilled Occupations
Region, Metro No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Effects?
Age Dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes
Father's Age and No No No Yes Yes
Age-Squared,
Female Dummy, and
Number of Siblings?
Father's Age at -.0002
Arrival * Non- (.0002)
English Speaking
Country of Origin
N 54 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to first- and second-generation
Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). The fraction of new immigrant arrivals, in the 5 years prior
to the Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural workers, by ethnicity and year, are
computed from the immigration records in Ferenczi and Willcox (1929). The mean fraction of new
immigrants who were laborers/servants across ethnicity-year cells is .483, and the interquartile range (from
.312 to .683) is .371. (See Appendix for more details). All regressions include Census year and ethnicity
main effects. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence
in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.9
2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills
Using
average of
Father's and
Mother's
Using Father's Literacy Literacy
In School In School In School In School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's Literacy .280** .281 ** .203** .149**
(Parental Capital) (.078) (.080) (.089) (.069)
Average Literacy .138** .138** .116** .094*
(Ethnic Capital) (.066) (.066) (.041) (.051)
Region, Metro Effects? No Yes Yes Yes
Age Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Father's Age and Age- No No Yes Yes
Squared?
Female .002 -003
(.005) (.005)
Father's Age at Arrival -.0003 -.0001
(.0005) (.0007)
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 56,308
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. The excluded instruments are the father's
age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-English speaking country of origin, and the fraction of new
immigrant arrivals, in the 5 years prior to the Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural
workers, by ethnicity and year. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy rates are computed from a sample
restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). All regressions
include Census year and ethnicity main effects, a female dummy, father's age at arrival, number of siblings,
a dummy indicating residence in a metropolitan area, and a full set of age dummies. Single (double)
asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.10
2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills:
Additional Results
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
on Parental on Parental on Ethnic on Ethnic
Benchmark Capital =0 Capital =.2 Capital =. 1 Capital =0
In School In School In School In School In School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Father's Literacy .203** .000 .200 .204** .211**
(Parental Capital) (.089) (.088) (.087)
Average Literacy .116** .153** .117** .100 .000
(Ethnic Capital) (.041) (.045) (.035)
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. The excluded instruments are the father's
age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-English speaking country of origin, and the fraction of new
immigrant arrivals, in the 5 years prior to the Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural
workers, by ethnicity and year. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy rates are computed from a sample
restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). All regressions
include Census year, ethnicity, region and female main effects as well as father's age, father's age squared,
father's age at arrival, number of siblings, and a vector of age dummies. Single (double) asterisk denotes
statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.11
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic
Specification Checks
Capital on Individual Skills:
Excluding Five Smallest
Including Father's Occupation Ethnic Groups
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's Literacy .047** .198** .050** .205**
(Parental Capital) (.008) (.093) (.009) (.091)
Average Literacy .147** .122** .138** .116**
(Ethnic Capital) (.021) (.042) (.023) (.043)
Father is in a Low-Skilled -.016** -.008
Occupation (.004) (.006)
N 69,864 69,864 69,266 69,266
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. The excluded instruments are the father's
age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-English speaking country of origin, and the fraction of new
immigrant arrivals, in the 5 years prior to the Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural
workers, by ethnicity and year. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy rates are computed from a sample
restricted to first- and second-generation Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). The low-skilled
occupations used in Columns 1 and 2 are agriculture, laborers and servants (the same ones used in the
construction of the instrument for ethnic capital). The five ethnic groups excluded in Columns 3 and 4 are
African, Spanish, Romanian, Armenian and Ruthenian, and correspond to the 5 rows with the smallest
counts in Table 1.2. All regressions include Census year, ethnicity, region and female main effects as well
as father's age, father's age squared, father's age at arrival, number of siblings, and a vector of age
dummies. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a
one-tailed test.
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Table 1.12
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills:
Exploring the Role of Geographic Concentration
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's Literacy .049** .203**
(Parental Capital) (.008) (.089)
Father's Literacy .047** .231
(Parental Capital) (.013) (.142)
* High Concentration
Father's Literacy .048** .182**
(Parental Capital) (.009) (.076)
* Low Concentration
Average Literacy .135** .116**
(Ethnic Capital) (.022) (.041)
Average Literacy .261* .141
(Ethnic Capital) (.157) (.195)
* High Concentration
Average Literacy .122** .109
(Ethnic Capital) (.030) (.084)
* Low Concentration
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. The concentration index is computed as the
fraction of all adults of working age in the region who are first- or second- generation and who have the
same ethnicity, and averages approximately. 12 for the entire sample. High (Low) concentration is then
defined as a dummy that equals one if the individual lives in a region where their ethnic group (first and
second generation) comprises 12% or more (less than 12%) of the population of working age, zero
otherwise. The excluded instruments are the father's age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-
English speaking country of origin, and the fraction of new immigrant arrivals, in the 5 years prior to the
Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural workers, by ethnicity and year. Ethnicity-year-
specific average literacy rates are computed from a sample restricted to first- and second-generation
Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). All regressions include Census year and ethnicity main
effects, a female dummy, father's age at arrival, number of siblings, a dummy indicating residence in a
metropolitan area, and a full set of age dummies. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical significance at
the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a one-tailed test.
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Table 1.13
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Parental and Ethnic Capital on Individual Skills:
Using Regional Endogamy Rates as a Measure of the Level of Interaction Within Groups
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's Literacy .049** .203**
(Parental Capital) (.008) (.089)
Father's Literacy .041** .171**
(Parental Capital) (.011) (.075)
* High Endogamy Rate
Father's Literacy .062** .259**
(Parental Capital) (.006) (.118)
* Low Endogamy Rate
Average Literacy .135** .116**
(Ethnic Capital) (.022) (.041)
Average Literacy .141** .140**
(Ethnic Capital) (.023) (.040)
* High Endogamy Rate
Average Literacy .095** .017
(Ethnic Capital) (.028) (.082)
* Low Endogamy Rate
N 69,864 69,864 69,864 69,864
Notes: Standard errors corrected for ethnicity-year clustering are reported in parentheses. The data are from
the Census IPUMS for 1910 and 1920, with the sample being restricted to second-generation Americans of
schooling age (6 to 18 years old) who reside with their parents. The endogamy rate is computed as the
fraction of married women in the region whose husband belongs to the same ethnic group, and averages
approximately .55 for the entire sample. High (Low) Endogamy Rate is then defined as a dummy that
equals one if the individual lives in a region where the endogamy rate for their ethnic group equals 55% or
more (less than 55%), zero otherwise. The excluded instruments are the father's age at arrival interacted
with a dummy for non-English speaking country of origin, and the fraction of new immigrant arrivals, in
the 5 years prior to the Census year, who were laborers or servants or agricultural workers, by ethnicity and
year. Ethnicity-year-specific average literacy rates are computed from a sample restricted to first- and
second-generation Americans of working age (19 to 60 years old). All regressions include Census year and
ethnicity main effects, a female dummy, father's age at arrival, number of siblings, a dummy indicating
residence in a metropolitan area, and a full set of age dummies. Single (double) asterisk denotes statistical
significance at the 90% (95%) level of confidence in a one-tailed test.
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2. The Effect of Education on Fertility: Evidence From
Compulsory Schooling Laws
2.1. Introduction
Social scientists have long observed a strong relationship between education and fertility.
Both across countries and over time, higher levels of schooling appear associated with
fewer children per woman. In particular, the last forty years have seen widespread
fertility declines accompanied by increases in educational attainment levels in most
Western countries. The question of whether this correlation is causal remains open,
however. Despite the various reasons to expect a causal relationship between schooling
and fertility, empirical research to date has not provided a definitive and satisfactory
answer.
The key challenge in estimating the effect of education on fertility decisions is
that unobserved characteristics affecting schooling choices are potentially correlated with
unobservable factors influencing the decision to have children. For instance, women with
high ability levels, stronger tastes for work or low discount rates are relatively more
likely to finish high school and attend college. At the same time, for any given level of
education, they are likely to be more inclined to pursue a professional career and delay
having children. Therefore, one might expect a negative relationship between years of
schooling and number of children even in the absence of any causal effect of education
on fertility. On the other hand, women with better access to credit markets may be more
likely both to attend school and to have children, whereas females coming from less
affluent households may lack the opportunities or incentives to get an education as well
as the means to raise children and support an extended family. As a result, a positive
spurious correlation between education and fertility is possible too. The presence of error
in available measures of schooling can also introduce a bias towards zero, thus creating
the appearance of a weaker correlation between the two variables than may exist in
reality.
Estimating the impact of schooling on fertility may help clarify the role of
education in demographic transitions. Moreover, this effect can be seen as yet another
dimension of the social return to schooling. To the extent that schooling choices of
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individuals have social consequences in the form of fiscal costs or welfare benefits,
which are not taken into account by individuals, then this constitutes another reason why
the social return to education may be different from its private return.27
An analysis of the impact of schooling on fertility is also motivated by important
fiscal and welfare policy implications. Falling fertility rates, along with longer life
expectancies, result in population ageing. Unless immigration flows are large enough to
offset this process (and countries are typically reluctant to let that happen), this tends to
reduce the labor force relative to the elderly population. In other words, it raises the
dependency ratio of retirees to working-age adults, thus putting pressure on public
spending in pensions and health care. This is a major concern in many industrialized
countries, where such fiscal burdens constitute a major threat to their current social
security systems. If secondary- and post-secondary education enrollment rates are
growing in those countries, no analysis of the sustainability of the welfare system can be
complete without an assessment of the impact of higher education on fertility, which in
turn affects the future size of the labor market. In developing countries, on the other hand,
decreasing fertility may reduce health risks for both women and children, and contribute
to improving welfare conditions, especially of rural households. Programs like the World
Bank's Female Secondary Schooling Assistance Project aim to achieve these goals
precisely by encouraging education of girls. The effectiveness of such ventures depends
on whether, and to what extent, female education stimulates reductions in fertility.
In order to solve the identification problem outlined above and estimate the effect
of education on fertility, I use changes in state compulsory schooling laws over time as a
source of exogenous variation in individual schooling choices. Female teenagers typically
faced compulsory attendance and child labor laws enacted by their state legislatures
several years or even decades prior to those women's fertility decisions. Moreover,
legislators appeared to be concerned with raising education levels and preventing
children from entering the labor force too young, and did not seem to be acting in
response to contemporaneous or anticipated changes in fertility patterns. Recent literature
27 Most of the research on social returns to education to date has been focused on the effect of an
individual's schooling on the wages of other workers in her social group (Acemoglu and Angrist (2000),
Heckman and Klenow (1998)), although some recent studies analyze the impact of individual schooling on
other outcomes with social repercussions, such as crime (Lochner and Moretti (2002)), or mortality (Lleras-
Muney (2002)).
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studying the causal links between education and labor market outcomes has used supply-
side instruments such as child schooling laws: Angrist and Krueger (1991) first
documented a relationship between quarter of birth and individual schooling and used it
to analyze private returns to education; Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) studied wage
spillovers; Lochner and Moretti (2004) analyzed effects on crime; and Lleras-Muney
(2004) studied mortality. Very little or no work has been done linking schooling and
fertility through the study of a natural experiment, however. An exception is McCrary
and Royer (2003), who use birthday information for Texan and Californian women in the
1990s and a regression discontinuity approach to study the effect of mothers' education
on infant mortality, by first establishing no impact of schooling on the probability of
becoming a mother (an age-specific fertility rate). Instead of relying solely on school age
entry laws (which is the rationale behind a strategy based on date of birth), this paper also
uses information on other regulations such as minimum school dropout age, and
minimum schooling requirements for leaving school and for entering the workforce, in
order to obtain a more complete picture of the institutional constraints affecting education
of women in all fifty contiguous states during five decades in the early- and mid-
twentieth century, a period when high school attendance rates rose dramatically.28
Instrumental variable (IV) estimates using data on women aged 40-49 from the
1950-1990 US Censuses suggest a strong, negative relationship between education and
fertility. A one-year increase in schooling is associated with a 0.33 reduction in the
average number of children. The magnitude of this effect appears to be larger than the
relationship uncovered by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, which
suggests the presence of measurement error in schooling. Further analysis indicates that
part of this difference is due to the existence of heterogeneity in the fertility return to
schooling across individuals and to non-linearity across education levels. Since the OLS
and IV estimators are different weighted sums of the distinct impacts of each additional
year of schooling on the number of children, with the IV placing more "weight" on the
levels of education which are most affected by the instruments,2 9 the estimates using
28 This is the education expansion known as the 'high school movement'. See Goldin (1998) for details.
29 Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that 2SLS and OLS estimates can be written as weighted averages of
individual IV estimators, and Lochner and Moretti (2004) derive the corresponding 2SLS and OLS weights
as a function of observable quantities.
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compulsory schooling laws as instruments provide an accurate approximation to the
effect of additional schooling on the fertility of women who are induced to increase their
education because of those laws.
Because education can affect fertility by reducing the likelihood that a woman
will marry and start a family, I also study the impact of schooling on marriage rates.
Estimates uncover no statistically significant relationship, which suggests that education
may be reducing fertility by delaying, but not by preventing, the decision to get married.
This hypothesis is further supported by estimates showing that schooling does indeed
raise the probability that a woman will reach the end of her fertile life-cycle with no
children. Finally, I use these estimates to calculate the contribution of education
expansion to the dramatic fertility declines observed in several Western countries, and
find that about a third of the documented reductions in fertility between 1960 and 1990
can be attributed to the observed increases in female schooling in those countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
theory, develops the estimation framework, and highlights the econometric issues
involved in attempting to identify the effect of education on fertility. Section III describes
the data and presents and interprets the base empirical results. Section IV discusses some
robustness checks and additional results and applications. Section V summarizes the
paper and concludes.
2.2. Theoretical and Econometric Framework
2.2.1. Fertility and Schooling: Theory
The most accepted theories in the Demography and Economics literature (Willis
(1973), Barro and Becker (1988), Livi-Baci (1997)) suggest that female education lowers
fertility through an increase in the opportunity cost of women's time where the
productive technology for children is time-intensive relative to the parents' technology
for their standard of living. In fact, theoretical models that seek to explain the number of
children born over the life-cycle highlight female wages as the key element in the
opportunity cost of childbearing. The canonical one-period, full-certainty model of
fertility (Montgomery and Trussell (1986)) where children are a normal good and their
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care requires time as well as money expenditures yields a shadow price of children that is
a function of the wage rate.30 Other models seek to explain fertility histories as stochastic
processes, where the woman is assumed to solve a sequential decision problem under
uncertainty. These include Wolpin (1984), Newman (1988), and Hotz and Miller (1988),
and have not yet produced a consensus about an appropriate empirical specification for
life cycle fertility. In any case, since returns to schooling are positive, this induces a
negative relationship between education and fertility. There are, however, other channels
through which schooling can affect a woman's decision to have children.
To borrow from Easterlin and Crimmins (1985)'s terminology, the above is the
'demand' component of the educational effect on fertility. 31 Schooling can also affect the
'supply' of children, however. More educated women may have better information about
health. By increasing awareness of the importance of food care, balanced nutrition,
personal hygiene or cleaning standards, education can raise the fecundity, or potential
reproductive capacity, of women. In this framework, schooling can have an additional
impact on fertility by reducing the psychological cost of fertility control, since education
may increase the ability or willingness to adopt new birth-control methods. In the limit,
by raising knowledge of the existence and functioning of contraceptives in the first place,
schooling may even bring the 'price' of fertility control down from infinity, thus allowing
women to have the chance to exercise some control on family size that would not have
been available otherwise.
The theories briefly reviewed above do not consider some additional channels that
can mediate the relationship between schooling and fertility. Completing additional years
of education necessarily entails spending more time in school. There is naturally a rather
30 This is just the (compensated) substitution effect. An increase in mothers' schooling also brings about an
increase in parents' income that encourages spending in all normal goods, including children, but it appears
safe to assume that this income effect must be small enough and hence the wage effect dominates. In fact,
more complex theories produce an even weaker income effect on the sheer number of children: Becker
(1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) incorporate the quality dimension of reproduction decisions in their
"child quality" fertility model. Their model predicts that any increase in parents' income raises both the
quantity and the quality of children. Since the income elasticity of the former is small compared to the
income elasticity of the latter, Becker contends, then the resulting increase in the amount spent on children
mainly takes the form of higher quality, thus allowing for the substitution (wage) effect to clearly dominate
the income effect on the number of children.
31 By 'demand for children', Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) refer to the number of children parents would
want in order to achieve their desired family size, in the absence of any natural constraints and under the
assumption that birth control mechanisms were known, available and costless. 'Supply of children' is, then,
the number of children a couple would have, were they to make no deliberate attempt to limit family size.
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mechanical effect of schooling on fertility if women tend not to have children while
continuing to attend high school or college, thus delaying the beginning of (and
effectively shortening) their reproductive life. Other mechanisms for education to affect
fertility include changes in tastes for children versus work. Schooling may alter or shape
the views that women have on their traditionally assigned role in society, encouraging
some women to devote themselves to a professional career to the expense of creating an
extensive family (or even of having children at all).
To sum up, theory suggests that there are several channels how schooling impacts
on fertility, all of them being negative expect for the 'supply' argument regarding health
conditions and fecundity. The combined sign of the overall effect is ambiguous, although
it seems reasonable to expect a negative relationship. In any case, the magnitude of such
effect is a purely empirical question.
2.2.2. Empirical Specification
In order to capture the causal relationship of interest, consider the regression
model:
Yit = a + -Sit + Ztr + at ++it , (2-1)
where yit is a measure of total completed fertility, the total number of children ever born
to woman i observed in the Census year t, sit is her schooling, 4 are Census year fixed
effects, zi is a vector of individual covariates that includes state-of-birth effects, year-of-
birth effects, and other demographic variables, and Eist is an individual error component.
Standard OLS estimates of equation (2-1) will be biased if schooling, sit, is correlated
with unobserved determinants of individual fertility choices contained in the residual
term i,. As argued above, this can be the case if ability, patience or tastes for work
encourage schooling and produce a low demand for children, which creates a negative
omitted variable bias, or if access to economic opportunities facilitates both education
and raising children, in which case there is a source of positive confounding bias, or in
the presence of measurement error, which creates attentuation bias towards zero (a
positive bias, iffl is indeed negative). Naturally, all these possibilities are not mutually
exclusive.
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To address the endogeneity of education and eliminate those sources of bias, I use
compulsory schooling laws as instruments that exogenously affect schooling choices. The
use of valid instruments for education should produce consistent estimates of in
equation (2-1). It is important to recognize, though, that the effect of education on
fertility may be non-linear in schooling and may vary across individuals. In that case, the
IV estimates must be interpreted as some weighted average of the heterogeneous
marginal effects of schooling on the fertility of those women most induced to raise their
education by the compulsory schooling laws being used as instruments.3 2
2.3. Data and Main Results
2.3.1. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis uses data on US-born white women from the 1950-1990 Census
microdata extracts for whom all the relevant variables are reported. Individuals born in
Hawaii or Alaska are excluded, since these states did not enter the Union until 1959, and
no information on compulsory attendance or child labor laws during the early twentieth
century is available. The sample is further restricted to women aged 40 to 49, who are
reaching or are already past the end of their fertile lifetime and who were 14 years old
between 1914 and 1964 (years for which information on compulsory schooling laws in
effect in each of the 50 contiguous states is available). The schooling variable is highest
grade completed, capped at 17 years to impose a uniform top-code across survey years.
Other technical details on the extracts and the definitions of the variables are documented
in the Data Appendix.
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the extract. The average age is
constant across censuses, while mean schooling increases by about 0.6 or 0.7 years
between 1950-60, 1960-70 and 1970-80, and then by slightly more than a year between
1990 and 2000. Total completed fertility, measured as the number of children per woman,
increases steadily from an average of 2.2 for individuals in the 1950 Census to 2.9 in
1980 (these are the mothers of the 'baby boom' children), and then goes back down to 2.2
32 The monotonicity assumption (namely, that compulsory schooling laws only have a positive or no effect
on individual schooling) is necessary for this interpretation of the IV estimator. See Angrist and Imbens
(1995), Imbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman (1997), Heckman and Vytlacil (1997) for more details.
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by 1990. Table 2.2 reports total completed fertility by educational attainment. In each of
the sample years higher education levels are associated with substantially lower average
numbers of children. The key feature to notice in Table 2.2 is that, while the average
moves around over time, the differences in fertility by education level are sizable and
persistent over time. This is further evidenced in Figure 1, which shows total completed
fertility by educational attainment for all cohorts of women born between 1885 and 1954.
For example, women born in 1925 who did not complete high school had an average of
3.4 children, whereas those in the same cohort who obtained a college degree gave birth
to 2.4 children on average. Looking at total fertility rates -the average number of
children a woman could expect to bear in her lifetime if she were to experience current
age-specific fertility rates- also reveals a similar pattern. As illustrated in Figures 2a and
2b, college graduates aged 27 or younger were less likely to give to birth to a child in
than high school dropouts both in 1960 and in 1990. Between ages 28 and 40, college
graduates are slightly more likely to have given birth during the reference year, but that
tiny advantage does not make up for the big difference in fertility rates for teenagers and
women in their early-to-mid twenties.3 3 In conclusion, it appears that college graduates
typically have about one less children on average than high school dropouts. Next I will
turn to regression analysis in order to control for state of birth, cohort of birth, and year
effects, and then to use instrumental variables to identify whether this observed
relationship can be interpreted as a causal effect of schooling.
2.3.2. OLS Estimates
Table 2.3 shows OLS estimates of equation (2-1) for the entire sample, and also
separately by Census year. Education appears to be negatively correlated with total
completed fertility after controlling for cohort of birth, state of birth, and year effects
using OLS. Column (2) adds state of residence fixed effects in order to absorb potential
heterogeneity across states in fertility patterns. Doing that leaves the point estimates
practically unchanged. While the estimates using single censuses (columns 4 to 8) show a
33 This translates into an estimated (using US Census data) TFR for high school dropouts of 3.7 in 1960 and
1.9 in 1990, compared to 2.7 and 1.3 for college graduates in 1960 and 1990, respectively.
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slight degree of variation across years,3 4 the table suggests that on average an additional
year of schooling appears to be associated with a reduction of about 0.13 in the average
number of children. Put another way, women with four additional years of schooling
appear to have on average 0.5 less children.
The OLS estimates presented here are consistent with the hypothesis that
schooling reduces completed fertility. If so, the effect appears to be quantitatively and
statistically significant, and fairly persistent over time. However, these estimates may
reflect the impact of unobserved characteristics that influence the probability of
completing higher levels of schooling and the decision to have children. For example, as
discussed in the previous section, women with lower discount rates are relatively less
likely to invest in education and a professional career, and more likely to marry and start
having children early. To the extent that variation in unobserved discount rates is
important, OLS estimates could be overstating the effect of schooling on fertility. On the
other hand, OLS could be underestimating that effect if measurement error in the
schooling variable is significant, and/or if there are significant disparities in background
and access to economic opportunities that promote education and child rearing.
2.3.3. Compulsory Schooling Laws as Instruments for Individual Schooling
The ideal instrumental variable induces exogenous variation in years of schooling
while being uncorrelated with measurement error, discount rates, ability, tastes for work,
or any other individual characteristics that can affect both education and fertility. I use
state-mandated restrictions on child labor and compulsory school attendance laws as
instruments for schooling. Compulsory attendance laws are condensed as the minimum
number of years a child had to be in school before being allowed to drop out, and are the
maximum of either the explicitly mandated minimum years of schooling in the state, or
the difference between the minimum dropout age and the maximum enrollment age.
Child labor laws are summarized as the minimum years of schooling required before
obtaining a work permit. Since the major reason to leave school typically was to work,
these act as constraints on schooling choices as well. Child labor laws are defined as the
34 These deviations may be simply reflecting time variation in omitted state characteristics in the
relationship between schooling and fertility, since these single-Census regressions do not include state of
residence effects.
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larger of the explicitly mandated minimum schooling required for a work permit, and the
difference between the minimum age for work and the maximum school enrollment age.
Compulsory schooling laws in the first half of the twentieth century have been
extensively studied by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Lleras-Muney (2004) and Lochner
and Moretti (2004). Lleras-Muney (2002) documents their effectiveness for both men and
women, and finds that they did not affect blacks. For this reason, I restrict my attention to
white women. The compulsory attendance laws and child labor laws in effect in each of
the 50 contiguous states were assigned to individuals in the sample based on the year in
which they turned 14 (which is calculated from year of birth, estimated using age on
Census day) and their state of birth (since no information on state of residence during
adolescence is available in the Census).
In the years relevant for my sample, 1914-1964, states changed child labor and
compulsor attendance laws several times, and generally upward.3 5 This resulted in an
increase over time in the fraction of women being exposed to more restrictive laws, as is
evident from observing the bottom eight rows in Table 2.1. For example, while no
woman in the sample from the 1950 Census had been exposed to laws requiring 9 or
more years in school before obtaining a work permit, by 1990 such laws had been in
place at age 14 in the state of birth of 43.5% of all women.
There is a sizable and statistically significant relationship between individual
schooling and sets of dummies for both types of compulsory schooling laws. This is
shown in Table 2.4, which display estimates for the first-stage regressions of years of
schooling on dummies for child labor laws requiring 7, 8, and 9 or more years in school,
and/or dummies for compulsory attendance laws mandating 9, 10, and 11 or more years
of schooling (the omitted categories are the least restrictive groups for child labor and
compulsory schooling laws); equations also include controls for state of birth, year of
birth and Census year. For instance, the entries in column 1 show that women born in
states requiring 9 or more years in school to issue a work permit ended up with .38 more
years of schooling completed than those born in states with a child labor law that required
6 or less years. In general, the estimated coefficients are consistent with the notion that
the more stringent the legislation, the stronger is its effect on average years of
35 See Lleras-Muney (2002) and Lochner and Moretti (2004).
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schooling.3 6 Moreover, the hypothesis of no joint significance of the estimated
coefficients is soundly rejected in every column (F-statistics are reported in the table).
The identifying assumption is that the timing of within-state changes in
compulsory schooling laws over time is orthogonal to unobservable characteristics of
women that may affect their fertility decisions years later, once other potential
confounding factors have been taken into account by conditioning on state of birth,
cohort of birth and Census year (and, in some specifications, also state of residence). This
hypothesis is reinforced by the results shown in Table 2.5. The columns in this table
report the estimated coefficients from regressions of a dummy for whether a woman
completed discrete levels of education as indicated in the column heading. The effect of
compulsory schooling laws is strongest for completion of high school levels of schooling,
and is smaller, and in most cases statistically insignificant, in columns corresponding to
higher levels of education. Finding that the laws increased the proportion attending
college as well as the fraction completing high school would have suggested that they
might have been correlated with underlying trends in education or other omitted factors
such as tastes or family background, and are therefore not exogenous, thus invalidating
them as instruments for schooling. Instead, the results indicate that this is not a problem
in the data, showing that the laws were not endogenous during this period.37
The different columns in Table 2.6, which report estimated coefficients from the
first-stage regression for subsamples of the data, show that the impact of the child labor
and compulsory attendance laws dummies remain significant after excluding each Census
year, therefore ensuring that the effectiveness of compulsory schooling laws is consistent
over time and across cohorts in the sample. Overall, the evidence seems to support the
validity of these laws as instruments for schooling.
36 Such effects were first documented for men in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). The effects for women
hereby reported are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable.
37 It is interesting to note that, up to 1 2 th grade, the laws have a significant positive effect on schooling
above required levels. Possible explanations include peer effects, educational sorting (Lang and Kropp
(1986)), or the fact that educational decisions are "lumpy" (Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)). On the other
hand, the appearance of quantitatively small, but statistically significant negative effects of compulsory
schooling laws on higher levels of schooling might reflect shifts in state resources away from local colleges
and to high schools concurrently with the enactment of laws requiring additional years of schooling.
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2.3.4. IVEstimates and Interpretation
The 2SLS estimates of equation (2-1) are reported in Table 2.7. Controlling for
state of residence, state of birth, year, and year of birth main effects, and using
compulsory schooling laws as instruments generates an estimate of the effect of
education on total completed fertility of -0.330 (with a standard error of .061) when
dummies for both child labor and compulsory attendance regulations are employed.3 8
This is still negative, and significantly larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate (the 95
percent confidence interval for this coefficient is [-0.445,-0.210] and comfortably
excludes the OLS estimate of-0.131), and indicates that, other things equal, having
completed three additional years of schooling reduces the number of children ever born
by one. Using compulsory attendance laws alone yields somewhat smaller (in absolute
value) estimates, although less precise and not significantly different from those
including child labor laws or both types of laws in the set of instruments.
The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates appears to suggest that OLS
understates the magnitude of the causal relationship of interest. In previous sections, I
pointed at measurement error in schooling, and at unobserved differences in access to
economic opportunities encouraging both education and fertility, as possible explanations
for a positive bias in OLS estimates. Measurement error is probably not a candidate in
this case, however, since the results in Table 2.3 showed that pulling 1990 Census data
from the sample does not affect the OLS estimates. If attenuation bias were responsible
for the discrepancy between the OLS and 2SLS coefficients, and given that the measure
of schooling is noisier in 1990, then one should expect the OLS estimate from a sample
that excludes that year to be significantly closer to the 2SLS estimate than the regular
OLS from using all of the data. That does not appear to be the case, however, which
indicates that a positive correlation between schooling and fertility induced by some
unobserved factor such as access to credit is likely to have caused the OLS estimate to be
biased upwards.3 9
38 All standard errors reported in this paper are corrected for state-of-birth/year clustering.
39 Similarly, if more educated women tend to marry relatively more educated, wealthier men, and demand
for the sheer number of children decreases with income, then women with high levels of schooling are less
likely to show higher fertility rates on average, thus creating a negative spurious correlation between these
two variables. To the extent that compulsory schooling laws do not alter matching decisions in the marriage
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Another plausible reason for the 2SLS estimates to differ from their OLS
counterparts lies in the difference between the weighing function underlying each
estimator. IV estimates reflect a weighted average of causal responses to each single-year
change in completed schooling, with the weights depending on the fraction of individuals
who are induced to make each transition by the compulsory schooling laws used as
instruments, while OLS estimates weigh individuals in proportion to their contribution to
the total variation in schooling, irrespective of the instruments.40 In the presence of non-
linearity and/or individual heterogeneity in the effect of schooling on fertility, the IV will
almost surely differ from the OLS estimate. Figure 3a plots the OLS and 2SLS weights
for the case where child labor laws as used as instruments, as well as the difference
between the two. These weights are computed using the formulae derived in Lochner and
Moretti (2004). As expected given the results shown in Table 2.5 (indicating that the
instruments induce changes in schooling at the secondary education level, but not at post-
high school levels), the 2SLS weights are larger than the OLS weights for levels of
education corresponding to high school, and comparable if not lower for levels beyond
high school. To the extent that the greatest impact of schooling on fertility decisions is
associated with changes at the secondary level of education, one should expect the 2SLS
estimates to be larger than OLS estimates. In fact, using the 2SLS weights to re-weight
the observed fertility responses to each additional year of schooling (i.e.: the year-by-year
changes in regression-adjusted fertility means net of state, year and cohort effects)
produces an estimate that is larger (more negative) than the OLS estimate and closer to
the 2SLS estimate, although not by much.41 This suggests that a small part of the reason
why 2SLS are more negative than OLS estimates lies in differences in the fertility return
to schooling across levels of education.4 2 Indeed, given the evidence that suggests that
market, then, 2SLS estimates are more negative than OLS because the instruments eliminate this additional
source of positive endogeneity bias.
40 In other words, IV uses only the variation in schooling that is correlated with the instrument. See Angrist
and Imbens (1995) for more details.
41 The changes in the regression-adjusted average number of children by years of schooling (obtained from
regressing number of children ever born on state of birth, state of residence, Census year and year of birth
dummies and using the predicted values evaluated at the means), weighted by the 2SLS weights, produce
an estimate of-0.17, compared with -0.13 from using the OLS weights.
42The fact that the heterogeneity in of fertility returns to schooling across education levels is small does not
necessarily imply that there is no heterogeneity in the effect of schooling across individuals. If, for
example, the women most affected by compulsory schooling laws happen to be those with the highest
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compulsory schooling laws encouraged further schooling of women who would have
otherwise dropped out from high school, the IV estimates are a better assessment than
OLS estimates of the likely fertility outcomes of education expansions that increase
female graduation rates from high school.
In order to further analyze the causal effect of education on fertility, and given
that Table 2.2 seems to suggest that the impact of schooling on fertility may be greatest at
high school completion, I estimate a model of fertility using an indicator for high school
graduation rather than total years of schooling. This will answer the question: how does a
change in the fraction of women graduating from high school affect fertility? The answer
to such question should be interesting also because fertility declines have been associated
historically with education expansions that increased female rates of enrollment in, and of
completion of, secondary education. Arguably, these are also the most relevant levels of
schooling for policy intervention.
The first two columns in Table 2.8 report OLS estimates of a model where the
regressor of interest is a dummy for having graduated from high school. The change in
fertility, net of state, year and cohort effects, associated with completion of secondary
school is -0.63. This is fairly consistent with the previous estimates for the linear model
in schooling, given that high school graduates have on average more than just one extra
year of schooling than high school dropouts. Next I move to IV estimation. Since Table
2.4 documented that child labor and compulsory attendance laws did induce an increase
in the fraction of women graduating from high school, the same identification strategy
remains valid in this case as in the model linear in years of schooling. The estimated
effect of high school graduation on fertility using the instruments is close to -1. The most
precisely estimated, which uses both sets of compulsory schooling laws, is -0.9. This
implies that completing secondary education leads women to having, on average,
approximately one less child. This supports the notion that the effect of schooling on
fertility is likely to be largest at twelfth grade, and reinforces the finding that estimates
that account for endogeneity show a sizable negative effect of education on fertility.
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discount rates and/or with the lowest access to credit, who have a larger fertility return to schooling relative
to the average individual in the distribution, then the IV estimator will be capturing the average marginal
effect for those women, and will not be an estimate of the average effect in the population.
An alternative approach for examining the relationship of interest for women with
education levels between 8 and 12 years of schooling consists in using completed years
of high school as the endogenous regressor. Unlike the model that uses a dummy for high
school graduation, this method has the advantage that it is not vulnerable to the miscoded
binary treatment problem (see Imbens and Agrist (1994)). Table 2.9 presents estimates of
the effect of an additional year of high school on fertility. As shown in columns 1 and 2,
the OLS estimates are now higher in value (around -0.22) and much closer to the IV. In
particular, the coefficients obtained by including compulsory attendance laws in the set of
instruments (also -0.22, and -0.26 when including all instruments), while comparable to
those obtained in the model with total years of schooling, become no longer significantly
different from the OLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 (even the IV estimates from using
only child labor laws -columns 3 and 4- are not statistically distinguishable from the
OLS estimates, although in this case this is just due to the loss in precision). This
reconciliation of the OLS and IV coefficients in this specification is further evidence that
the effect of education on fertility is largest for women who completed at least some high
school education, which are the individuals most affected by the instruments.
2.4. Additional Results and Applications
2.4.1. The Impact of Schooling on Marriage and Childlessness
One of the possible ways for education to affect fertility is through marriage
status. If schooling reduces the likelihood that a woman will marry, then naturally higher
schooling levels will bring about reductions in the number of children. I explore this
possibility by estimating models of the probability of having ever been married on years
of schooling. Panel A of Table 2.10 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of
education on marriage status. While OLS shows a small, but statistically significant,
negative coefficient, the 2SLS estimates show no systematic relationship and are all
insignicant. Hence there is no evidence that schooling affects the probability that a
woman will marry. The documented fertility-reducing effect of education is not due to
more educated women being significantly more likely to remain single.
Since the negative impact of schooling on fertility does not seem to operate
through marriage, it seems natural to ask whether schooling does affect the probability
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that a woman will remain childless until the end of her fertile years. Panel B of Table
2.10 shows estimates of models of the probability of not having had any children on years
of schooling. In this case, both 2SLS and OLS regressions produce statistically and
quantitatively significant coefficients. Using compulsory attendance laws yields an
estimate of 0. 18, which implies that an additional year of schooling raises the probability
of not having any children by almost 2 percentage points. Other IV specifications
produce somewhat smaller but not very precisely estimated, and hence not significantly
different coefficients. Overall, this constitutes suggestive evidence that schooling may be
reducing fertility partly by increasing the proportion of women who reach the end of their
fertile lives without children, even though these women may still be about as likely to get
married as their less educated counterparts.
2.4.2. An Application: The Role of Education Expansions in Fertility Declines
To put the above estimates of the impact of schooling on fertility into perspective,
it is useful to look at several countries that experienced dramatic fertility declines and
education expansions in the second half of the twentieth century, and compare the actual
reductions in fertility with those implied by these estimates from the observed increases
in education levels of women.
Although still high in many parts of the world, total fertility rates have been
decreasing dramatically during the twentieth century, mostly after 1960.43 As populations
become more educated, the number of children per woman falls. In particular, the last
forty years have seen widespread fertility declines accompanied by increases in
educational attainment levels in most Western countries. While in 1960 the average
woman in North America or in industrialized Europe would have 3.4 and 2.6 children
respectively, fertility rates in every developed nation are now below the replacement rate
of 2.1, ranging from 2.0 in the United States to 1.6 in France and Canada, 1.4 in Japan,
and just 1.2 in Italy.4 4 In some cases where education expansion has been relatively more
43 The worldwide Total Fertility Rate fell from around 6 children per woman in 1900 to 2.7 in 2003. In
1960, this rate was 4.9. Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of
the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2001 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp
44 According to the latest Population Bulletin of the Population Reference Bureau (March 2004), as of 2003
all industrialized countries have fertility rates below 2.1 children per woman, the level needed to ensure the
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recent and initial levels were particularly low, the decline in fertility between 1960 and
2000 has been even more dramatic: it went from 2.9 to 1.1 in Spain, from 3.2 to 1.4 in
Portugal, and from 3.8 to 1.9 in Ireland.
Table 2.11 reports data from six European countries that underwent significant
reductions in fertility between 1960 and 1990. At the same time, average female
education increased in all of them. It is natural to ask: to what extent did education
expansion contribute to the decline in fertility in each one of those countries? Using the
2SLS estimates from Table 2.6 it is possible to provide an answer to that question. The
predicted fall in fertility from the observed rise in female education is computed for each
country and presented in columns (5) and (6), each using one of the extremes in the range
of 2SLS estimates obtained from the different specifications in Table 2.7. The fact that
these countries saw increases in education at or around the high school levels makes the
exercise particularly meaningful if the 2SLS estimates are capturing the marginal effect
of education on fertility for women at those education levels.
The estimated effects of schooling on fertility imply, for example, that between
21% and 28% of the fertility drop in Italy between 1960 and 1990 can be explained by
the increase in education experienced by its female population during that period. In
general, about a quarter of the fertility decline in Germany, Italy and Ireland, a third of
the drop in Portugal and Spain, and as much as half of the fall in Greece can be attributed
to the effect of rising female education.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
There are a number of reasons to expect that education reduces fertility. By raising
wages, education increases the opportunity cost of having children and spending time
away from work. Education may also make women more aware of methods of birth
control, and more accepting of alternative lifestyles that do not necessarily include
marrying early and having children. It is also possible that more educated women enjoy
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long-term replacement of the population. Moreover, the United Nations projected in 2002 that fertility
levels will likely fall below replacement in three out of four developing countries by 2050 (UN Press
Release POP/850).
higher husband's earnings, if there is assertive matching, and that may encourage demand
for children. Empirical evidence on the effect of education on fertility has implications
for welfare and fiscal policy and is also of interest for economic theory.
In order to identify the magnitude of the relationship between schooling and total
completed fertility, this paper uses changes in state compulsory attendance and child
labor laws over time to generate exogenous variation in schooling of women in an
extended sample from the US Census that includes 1950 through 1990 data. The finding
that three additional years of schooling result in one less children per woman on average
is consistent and robust to a number of specification checks. Instrumental variables
estimates also suggest that most of this effect is not channeled through lower marriage
rates. Educated women are not less likely to marry, however they are more likely to reach
the end of their fertile lifecycle without having any children, which is consistent with the
hypothesis that education delays marriage and family formation.
I further argue that the estimated impact of schooling on the decision to have
children can shed some light on the dramatic demographic changes experienced in the
last few decades by countries with large expansions in education. As much as a third or
more of the fertility decline observed in several Western countries such as Spain or
Ireland can be attributed to a rise in their female education levels. This suggests that the
fertility-reducing impact of schooling, while constituting an external benefit in less
developed countries with high population densities and growth rates, can be regarded as
an external cost in more advanced societies where the fertility rate is already significantly
below replacement, the dependency rates of workers to pension recipients is already low,
and the expected contribution of the average young person to the public budget is clearly
positive, as is currently the case in most of the industrialized world. In those countries,
the schooling effects on fertility represent a negative external effect of education that
should contribute to better understand the overall social impacts of human capital
accumulation.
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Data Appendix
This study uses data from the 1950 General (1/330 sample), 1960 General (1% sample),
1970 Form 1 State and Form 2 State (both 1% samples), 1980 5% State A (a 5% sample),
and 1990 1% unweighted (a 1% random self-weighted sample created by IPUMS)
Census IPUMS files. See Ruggles and Sobek (1997) for more details on the IPUMS
system.
The extracts include all US-born (except Alaska and Hawaii) white women aged
40-49 at the time of the Census survey. The 1950 sample is limited to "sample line"
individuals (this is, those with long-form responses), the only for whom information on
children born is available. The schooling variable used for 1950 through 1980 is the
Census extracts variable HIGRADE (general), the IPUMS recode of the highest grade
completed. The 1990 Census only reports schooling in broader categories; therefore it is
not directly comparable with the information from previous surveys. Years of schooling
in that year were assigned from group means for white women in each category reported
in Park (1994, Table 5), who uses a one-time overlap questionnaire from the February
1990 Current Population Survey to construct averages for the categories found in the
1990 Census. Finally, in order to ensure consistency of the schooling measure across all
five Census years, the resulting variable was capped at 17, the highest grade completed
available in the 1950 Census.
The compulsory attendance laws and child labor laws in effect in each of the 50
contiguous states in the years 1914-1964 were assigned to all individuals in the sample on
the basis of their state of birth and the year in which they turned 14 (which is calculated
from year of birth, estimated using age on Census day). More details on the data sources
for these laws are given in Appendix B of Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). Baseline
regressions that use compulsory schooling laws matched by age at 16 produced
qualitatively similar results.
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Figure 2a: Age-Specific Fertility Rates, by Education: 1960
Source: Authors calculations from 1960 Census IPUMS
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Figure 2b: AgeSpecific Fertility Rates, by Education: 1990
Source: Author's calculations from 1990 Census IPUMS
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Figure 3a: 2SLS Weights and OLS Weights
Instruments: Child Labor Laws
Years of Schooling
*2SLS (CL) "-OLS -'"DIFF
Figure 3b: 2SLS Weights and OLS Weights
Instruments: Compulsory Attendance Laws
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Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics for the Census IPUMS extraction
Variables 1950-90 1950 1960
Dependent Variable
#Children Ever Born
(Completed Fertility)
Childless
Ever Married
Years of Schooling
Age
2.53
(1.95)
.154
(.361)
.948
(.222)
2.21
(2.26)
.252
(.434)
.928
(.258)
2.31
(2.00)
.194
(.396)
.944
(.230)
Regressor
11.56
(2.89)
9.96
(3.24)
10.61
(2.89)
Covariates
44.37
(2.87)
44.23
(2.89)
44.33
(2.85)
Instruments
Percent Child Labor 6
or less
Percent Child Labor 7
Percent Child Labor 8
Percent Child Labor
9+
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 8 or less
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 9
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 10
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 11+
N
.1801
.2753
.3759
.1686
.2642
.4445
.0650
.2263
888,420
.4805
.4498
.0698
.0000
.6066
.3753
.0181
.0000
23,315
.5225
.0605
.0663
93,743
81
.2267
.3731
.3487
.0515
.3507
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white
women born in the US (except Alaska and Hawaii) and aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard deviations
are in parentheses. All other entries are means.
- -
Table 2.1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics for the Census IPUMS extraction
Variables 1970 1980 1990
Dependent Variable
#Children Ever Born
(Completed Fertility)
Childless
Ever Married
Years of Schooling
Age
2.80
(2.02)
.125
(.330)
.985
(.208)
2.94
(1.86)
.101
(.302)
.960
(.195)
2.16
(1.45)
.148
(.355)
.944
(.230)
Regressor
11.38
(2.65)
12.10
(2.51)
13.19
(2.34)
Covariates
44.55
(2.86)
44.46
(2.91)
44.13
(2.85)
Instruments
Percent Child Labor 6
or less
Percent Child Labor 7
Percent Child Labor 8
Percent Child Labor
9+
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 8 or less
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 9
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 10
Percent Compulsory
Attendance 11+
N
.1942
.2445
.4956
.0657
.2524
.4403
.0783
.2289
194,279
.0533
.2408
.4141
.2917
.1190
.4374
.0894
.3542
454,712
.4399
.0585
.3902
122,371
82
.0295
.1667
.3687
.4351
.1115
- - - -
Table 2.2
Total Completed Fertility by Educational Attainment
1950-90 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
All women 2.53 2.21 2.31 2.80 2.94 2.16
College 1.93 1.28 1.77 2.39 2.29 1.67
graduates
Some 2.31 1.68 1.99 2.69 2.78 2.10
College
High School 2.48 1.69 2.06 2.67 2.90 2.29
Graduates
High School 2.89 2.60 2.62 3.09 3.45 2.82
Dropouts
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white
women born in the US (except Alaska and Hawaii) and aged 40-49 in the Census Year. All entries are
means. 'College Graduates' is defined as having completed 16 or more years of schooling; 'Some College'
as having completed more than 12 but less than 16 years of schooling; 'High School Graduates' as having
completed exactly 12 years of schooling, and 'High School Dropouts' as having completed less than 12
years of schooling.
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Table 2.3
OLS Estimates of the Effect of Schooling on Total Completed Fertility
1950-90 1950-90 1950-80 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years of -.131 -.128 -.131 -.166 -.133 -.104 -. 138 -.131
Schooling (.002) (.002) (.002) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
State of
Residence No Yes Yes No No No No No
Main
Effects
R-squared .074 .078 .068 .086 .055 .034 .048 .076
N 888,420 888,420 766,049 23,315 93,743 194,279 454,712 122,371
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to women
aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses.
Entries are estimates of the effect of years of schooling on the measure of Total Completed Fertility,
namely the discrete choice variable 'Children Ever Born'. All regressions contain Census year, year of birth
and state of birth main effects.
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Table 2.4
Compulsory Schooling Laws as Instruments for Years of Schooling: First-Stage Estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child Labor Laws
CL7 .175 .184 .155 .164
(Percent Child (.028) (.027) (.030) (.030)
Labor 7)
CL8 .163 .174 .137 .148
(Percent Child (.027) (.026) (.029) (.029)
Labor 8)
CL9 .386 .385 .336 .340
(Percent Child (.034) (.034) (.037) (.037)
Labor 9+)
Compulsory Attendance Laws
CA9 .079 .092 .024 .034
(Percent (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023)
Compulsory
Attendance 9)
CA10 .126 .118 .094 .086
(Percent (.031) (.031) (.033) (.033)
Compulsory
Attendance 10)
CAll .222 .208 .115 .099
(Percent (.029) (.028) (.031) (.031)
Compulsory
Attendance 11+)
State of Residence
Main Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-statistic 47.02 45.29 20.61 18.09 27.52 25.43
(p-value) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R-squared .171 .178 .171 .177 .171 .178
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white
women born in the US (except Alaska and Hawaii) and aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors
corrected for state-of-birth/year-of-birth clustering are shown in parentheses. All regressions contain
Census year, year of birth and state of birth main effects. The sample size is 888,420.
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Table 2.5
Effects of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Discrete Levels of Schooling
Completed Completed Completed Completed Completed
Variables 8+ Years of 10+ Years of 12+ Years of 14+ Years of 16+ Years of
Schooling Schooling Schooling Schooling Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent .922 .777 .652 .186 .115
Variable Mean
A. Child Labor Laws
CL7 .031 .023 .015 .004 .002
(Percent Child (.004) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.002)
Labor 7)
CL8 .037 .025 .026 -.008 -.010
(Percent Child (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.003)
Labor 8)
CL9 .064 .057 .057 -.005 -.006
(Percent Child (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.004)
Labor 9+)
F-statistic 60.02 44.28 35.84 6.08 10.08
(p-value) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0004) (.0001)
R-squared .085 .135 .146 .048 .050
B. Compulsory Attendance Laws
CA9 .029 .012 .019 -.009 -.009
(Percent (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.002)
Compulsory
Attendance 9)
CA10 .018 .024 .039 -.005 -.007
(Percent (.004) (.006) (.006) (.003) (.002)
Compulsory
Attendance 10)
CAI1 .025 .044 .051 -.003 -.007
(Percent (.004) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.003)
Compulsory
Attendance 11+)
F-statistic 27.48 26.04 34.81 4.32 6.04
(p-value) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0048) (.0004)
R-squared .084 .135 .146 .048 .050
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white
women born in the US (except Alaska and Hawaii) and aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors
corrected for state-of-birth/year-of-birth clustering are shown in parentheses. All regressions contain
Census year, year of birth, state of birth and state of residence main effects. The sample size is 888,420.
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Table 2.6
Effects of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Years of Schooling: Robustness Checks
Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
Variables 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. ChildLabor Laws
CL7 .133 .203 .239 .180 .153
(Percent Child (.025) (.033) (.033) (.030) (.029)
Labor 7)
CL8 .154 .181 .204 .191 .121
(Percent Child (.023) (.030) (.036) (.031) (.029)
Labor 8)
CL9 .344 .374 .473 .425 .259
(Percent Child (.031) (.037) (.041) (.043) (.040)
Labor 9+)
F-statistic 46.28 37.10 51.50 34.30 15.54
(p-value) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R-squared .156 .181 .224 .189 .113
B. Compulsory Attendance Laws
CA9 .107 .097 .148 .087 .027
(Percent (.021) (.026) (.029) (.026) (.025)
Compulsory
Attendance 9)
CA10 .155 .064 .114 .130 .103
(Percent (.026) (.035) (.045) (.036) (.036)
Compulsory
Attendance 10)
CAI 1 .229 .180 .307 .206 .133
(Percent (.025) (.031) (.039) (.032) (.033)
Compulsory
Attendance 11+)
F-statistic 27.71 13.43 21.54 13.61 6.78
(p-value) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R-squared .156 .180 .223 .188 .113
N 865,105 794,677 694,141 433,708 766,049
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to white
women born in the US (except Alaska and Hawaii) and aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors
corrected for state-of-birth/year-of-birth clustering are shown in parentheses. All regressions contain
Census year, year of birth and state of birth main effects.
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2SLS Estimates
Table 2.7
of the Effect of Schooling on Total Completed Fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments CL CL CA CA CL & CA CL & CA
Years of -.327 -.344 -.264 -.295 -.302 -.330
Schooling (.065) (.066) (.085) (.091) (.058) (.061)
State of
Residence No Yes No Yes No Yes
Main
Effects
First Stage for Schooling
CL 7 .175 .184 .155 .164
(.028) (.027) (.030) (.030)
CL 8 .163 .174 .137 .148
(.027) (.026) (.029) (.029)
CL 9 .386 .385 .336 .340
(.034) (.034) (.037) (.037)
CA 9 .079 .092 .024 .034
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023)
CA 10 .126 .118 .094 .086
(.031) (.031) (.033) (.033)
CA 11 .222 .208 .115 .099
(.029) (.028) (.031) (.031)
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to women
aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses.
Entries are two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of years of schooling on the measure of Total
Completed Fertility, namely the discrete choice variable 'Children Ever Born', using the excluded
instruments indicated, i.e.: a set of dummies indicating state and year specific labor and school attendance
laws that were in effect in the state of birth of the individual at age 14. All regressions contain Census year,
year of birth and state of birth main effects. The sample size for all columns is 888,420.
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Table 2.8
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of High School Graduation on Total Completed Fertility
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CL CL CA CA CL & CL &
CA CA
High School
Graduate
(Completed
12+ years of
schooling)
-. 635 -.624
(.013) (.012)
-1.002 -1.163
(.352) (.370)
State of
Residence
Main Effects
R-squared
No Yes
.074
No Yes No Yes No Yes
.078
First Stage for High School Graduation
.017
(.005)
.027
(.005)
.056
(.006)
.015
(.005)
.026
(.005)
.057
(.006)
.010 .007
(.005) (.005)
.018 .016
(.005) (.005)
.041 .040
(.006) (.006)
.018 .019 .012 .013
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
.035 .039 .033 .035
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
.049 .051 .037 .038
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005)
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to women
aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses.
Entries are estimates of the effect of high school graduation on of Total Completed Fertility, namely the
discrete choice variable 'Children Ever Born'. High school graduation is defined as a binary variable that
equals one if the individual completed 12 or more years of schooling, and zero otherwise. Entries in the
2SLS columns are two-stage least squares estimates using the excluded instruments indicated, i.e.: a set of
dummies indicating state and year specific labor and school attendance laws that were in effect in the state
of birth of the individual at age 14. All regressions contain Census year, year of birth and state of birth
main effects. The sample size for all columns is 888,420.
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Instruments
-.943
(.346)
-.994
(.362)
-.897
(.269)
-.900
(.286)
CL 7
CL 8
CL 9
CA 9
CA 10
CA 11
---------- --
Table 2.9
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Years of High School on Total Completed Fertility
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instruments CL CL CA CA CL & CL &
CA CA
Years of -.218 -.214 -.375 -.387 -.228 -.212 -.264 -.265
High (.005) (.004) (.092) (.093) (.094) (.097) (.073) (.075)
School
State of
Residence No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Main
Effects
R-squared .068 .072
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to women
aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses.
Entries are estimates of the effect of completed years of high school on Total Completed Fertility, namely
the discrete choice variable 'Children Ever Born'. Entries in the 2SLS columns are two-stage least squares
estimates using the excluded instruments indicated, i.e.: a set of dummies indicating state and year specific
labor and school attendance laws that were in effect in the state of birth of the individual at age 14. All
regressions contain Census year, year of birth and state of birth main effects. The sample size for all
columns is 888,420.
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Table 2.10
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Schooling on Marital Status and Childlessness
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Probability of Marriage
CL CL CA
-.0028 -.0028 .0058
(.0002) (.0002) (.0049)
.0059
(.0049)
.0011
(.0078)
CA CL & CL &
CA CA
-.0014
(.0079)
.0031
(.0046)
.0022
(.0047)
No Yes
.009
No Yes No Yes No Yes
.011
B. Childlessness
CL CL CAInstruments CA CL & CL &
CA CA
Years of .0091 .0088 .0061 .0058 .0178 .0194 .0087 .0086
Schooling (.0002) (.0002) (.0060) (.0061) (.0076) (.0078) (.0050) (.0052)
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared .027 .029
NOTE: The data are from the Census IPUMS for 1950 through 1990, with the sample restricted to women
aged 40-49 in the Census Year. Standard errors corrected for state-year clustering are shown in parentheses.
Entries in Panel A are estimates of the effect of years of schooling on the probability of marriage,
constructed as a binary variable that equals one if the women was ever married, and zero otherwise. Entries
in Panel B are estimates of the effect of years of schooling on childlessness, defined as a binary variable
that equals one if the women never had any children, and zero otherwise. Entries in the 2SLS columns are
two-stage least squares estimates using the excluded instruments indicated, i.e.: a set of dummies indicating
state and year specific labor and school attendance laws that were in effect in the state of birth of the
individual at age 14. All regressions contain Census year, year of birth and state of birth main effects. The
sample size for all columns is 888,420.
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Instruments
Years of
Schooling
State of
Residence
Main
Effects
R-squared
State of
Residence
Main
Effects
- --
Implied changes
Table 2.11
in fertility for selected EU countries, 1960-90
Avge. Average
Years of Fertility yschoolso- fertility90 -
Country Year Schooling Rate yschool 6o fertility60 ft*Afertility 6 0_9o % explained
,0-.264 /f=-.353 /8=-.264 /-.353
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spain 1960 4.16 2.9
Spain 1970 4.31 2.9
Spain 1980 4.75 2.2
Spain 1990 6.05 1.3 1.74 -1.6 -0.459 -0.614 28.71 38.39
Portugal 1960 1.53 3.2
Portugal 1970 1.92 3.0
Portugal 1980 2.84 2.2
Portugal 1990 3.26 1.6 1.34 -1.4 -0.354 -0.473 25.27 33.79
Ireland 1960 6.67 3.8
Ireland 1970 6.61 3.9
Ireland 1980 7.65 3.3
Ireland 1990 8.13 2.1 1.52 -1.8 -0.401 -0.537 22.29 29.81
Greece 1960 3.51 2.3
Greece 1970 4.43 2.4
Greece 1980 5.79 2.2
Greece 1990 6.36 1.4 1.93 -1.0 -0.510 -0.681 50.95 68.13
Germany 1960 7.76 2.4
Germany 1970 8.03 2.0
Germany 1980 8.28 1.6
Germany 1990 8.45 1.5 0.42 -0.5 -0.111 -0.148 22.18 29.65
Italy 1960 4.2 2.4
Italy 1970 4.79 2.4
Italy 1980 4.77 1.6
Italy 1990 5.67 1.3 0.88 -1.1 -0.232 -0.311 21.12 28.24
NOTE: The fertility data come from Eurostat, as reported in E. Phillip Davis 'Population Aging and Retirement Income
Provision in the European Union' (1998). The education data come from the Barro-Lee dataset ['see Barro, Robert and
J.W. Lee, "International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality, AER, Papers and Proceedings, 86(2), pp.
218-223] which includes estimates of average schooling years in the female population aged 25+ for 126 countries in
the world.
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3. Family Allowances and Female Labor Force Participation
3.1. Introduction
In recent years, public policies aimed at facilitating the reconciliation of women's
working life and family life have been implemented by many governments in OECD
countries as part of a broader agenda to further all aspects of equal opportunities. In some
cases, particularly in Europe, these measures also address a growing concern for low
fertility rates and the subsequent threat they pose to the sustainability of public pension
systems. Family allowances and child care subsidies are two such policies. They both aim
at reducing the costs of child rearing to the family, and they both should, if implemented,
induce an increase in the number of women who decide to have children. Their effects on
the current size of the labor market, however, will theoretically differ.
The theory section of this paper uses a simple model of household production of
child care to highlight the distinct nature of these transfers and their different effects on
the labor market. While child care subsidies are awarded to working mothers, and
therefore can only have a non-negative effect on labor force participation, receipt of
family allowances is not conditional on employment status. If households pool all sources
of income together, then increasing family allowances should raise unearned income and
hence encourage women to reduce their labor supply and even to drop out of the labor
force.45 Such a claim is often made, however, without any evidence to support it.
Empirical estimates of these effects are therefore necessary to inform any choice between
these two different policy instruments.
The empirical literature has largely focused on the US, where universal family
allowances do not exist, and mostly overlooked other countries. Partly as a result of that,
the role of child allowances on labor market outcomes has not been investigated yet.
Several studies have used US and Canada data to analyze the effect of child care costs on
labor market outcomes of married women.46 Blau and Robins (1988), Connelly (1992),
45 There is evidence, however, of some kind of intrahousehold 'flypaper effect' (see Jacobi 1997). In other
words, if households tend to use family allowances to purchase goods and services associated with raising
children (i.e.: inputs in the production of child quality), then these allowances will not have a negative
income effect on labor supply --they might even increase it. Therefore, allowances should be treated
separately from other sources of income in the household model.
46 See Blau (2000) for a detailed recent review. He argues that the most reliable estimates (corresponding to
those studies which include both paid and informal child care, and which do not assume that paid care is
always the best option) point to effects that are fairly small.
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Blau (1995), Ribar (1995), Blau and Hagy (1998), and Lemke et al. (2000), among
others, provide evidence suggesting that a reduction in the price of child care will
increase the probability of maternal employment and labor force participation, even
though the range of estimates is quite large. Moreover, this type of studies does not
directly measure subsidies and their impact, but rather make an inference from the
estimated price effects. More direct evidence on the employment effects of child care
subsidies is provided by evaluations of actual child care subsidy programs. These include
Berger and Black (1992), who use data on two Kentucky programs passed in 1989 to
estimate that maternal employment rises by 8 to 25 percentage points as a result of the
introduction of a $46 weekly subsidy; and Gelbach (1999), who uses quarter-of-birth as
an instrument in the 1980 US Census to estimate that access to free public kindergarten
school increased employment of single mothers by four to five percentage points.
Meyers, Heintze and Wolf (2000) also found, using data on Californian welfare recipients
in 1992-95, a positive relationship between receipt of child care subsidies and
employment. Unlike child care subsidies, however, the effects of family allowances on
employment have not been studied in the literature.
The empirical analysis in this paper attempts to address that question by looking
at the labor force status of women receiving different levels of family allowances before
and after a reform of such program in the United Kingdom. The estimation uses data
from the British Household Panel for 1998-2000. These data are useful for the purpose of
this paper because the BHP includes comprehensive information on employment status
and receipt of all kinds of benefits for thousands of women sampled before and after the
policy changes. The data show no statistically significant effects of family allowances on
labor force participation of women. Even if the results were to be taken at face value,
they would imply the effects are negative but quantitatively very small.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II begins by
developing a simple model of the household choice of labor supply, fertility and home
production of child care, emphasizing the predicted effects on labor market outcomes of
different policies aimed at increasing fertility. Section III describes the data sources and
the identification strategy used in the empirical analysis. Section IV presents and
interprets the estimation results. Finally, Section V concludes by summarizing the main
findings and suggesting directions for future research.
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3.2. Background
Family allowances, also commonly referred to as child benefits, are a regular (usually
monthly or weekly) government cash payment given to parents depending on the
presence, number, and sometimes the age and ordinal position of children in the family.
These benefits are commonly modest (on average, less than 10 percent of mean wages),
but sometimes contribute a significant component of family income, especially for large
or low-income families. Coverage is generally extended to children from the time of birth
to the age of majority or completion of formal education, provided other eligibility
criteria are met. Currently 88 countries in the world provide family allowances, in some
cases also supplemented by birth grants, school grants, special supplements for single
parents, or supplements for disabled children.47
Family allowance programs were initially motivated mostly by pro-natalist
objectives. They originated in the private sector late in the 19th century, partly in
response to proposals to relate workers' wages to their family responsibilities. Therefore,
they were originally available as an employment-based benefit only, and limited to
families with at least one wage earner. Nowadays, these programs mainly aim at
equalizing the financial burden of those families with and those without children
(horizontal equity), and at redistributing resources from the well off to the poor and thus
indirectly reducing the rate of child poverty (vertical equity). Coverage is universal in
many countries, regardless of parental income (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom);
however, some have means-tested benefits (Australia, Canada, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain), and few still restrict benefits to families with at
least one employed parent (Belgium, Greece). In some cases, although there is a universal
level of benefits, a supplement is available to low-income families (Austria), or a means-
tested premium is provided to single-parent households (Ireland, France).
47 See full list with details in the Spring issue brief of The Clearinghouse on International Developments in
Child, Youth and Family Policies (2002).
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Benefit levels, not unlike coverage and eligibility rules, also vary greatly across
nations. Moreover, the rate per child is in some cases uniform, regardless of the total
number of children in the family (Australia, Spain, Norway, Sweden), while in other
cases the rate is larger for later children or even increasing for each additional child
(Italy, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, France).48 Southern European countries (Spain,
Portugal, Greece, Italy) have particularly low levels of benefits, even relative to other
countries. In the case of Spain, however, current talk of reforms suggests that both the
coverage and the level of generosity of the system are likely to increase in the near future.
This is in line with the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council in March
2000, which emphasized the reduction of poverty and social exclusion as one of the key
common social objectives within the European Union, and identified children as one of
the specific target groups for priority action. Many Member States are now paying
particular attention to the position of children living in poor households and have been
considering the implementation of more generous family allowance plans. An analysis of
the effects of this type of programs should help inform such decisions.
Before moving on to the description of the British case, it is important to
underline that the United States has no family allowance program. That probably explains
why there has been no attention directed at evaluating such programs, whereas the
literature on child care subsidy programs is already considerable.4 9
48 In France, moreover, a family becomes eligible for an allowance only after the second child is born.
49 For a full picture of how countries provide additional income to families with children, however, both tax
and cash benefits should be considered. Historically, many countries have also allowed tax deductions
(which are regressive, since they are subtracted from the taxable income base before calculating tax
liability, and hence the value of the benefit depends on the marginal tax rate) or tax credits (which are a
reduction in tax liability, but also benefit more affluent families unless the credits are refundable) to
families with children. In recent years, there has been an increased use of the tax system, with some
countries supplementing their allowances by targeted child or family tax benefits. Some nations have even
substituted specially targeted tax benefits for family allowances. In the United States, for example, a
combination of non-refundable and partially refundable tax credits exist, but the country does not yet have
a universal benefit for all families with children. Only Canada and Israel (and also the UK, after the period
studied in this paper) provide a refundable tax credit that effectively works as a cash payment to low-
income families with children -in that case, the administration of family allowances has shifted from their
social welfare system to their tax ministry, but the tax benefit continues to be a cash benefit.
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Family allowances in the United Kingdom
The Child Benefit 50 program in the United Kingdom is a universal cash benefit
paid to families with children. It is weighted towards the first child, with the rate for
subsequent children being lower than the main rate. Neither of these rates depends on the
age of the child. Child Benefit is normally paid for children up to the age of 1651. The
payments are made weekly to the mother or to the parent the child is living with.
A policy reform was introduced starting in 1999, aiming at improving the
financial position of most families with children. That year saw a large increase in child
benefit for the eldest child. As shown in Table 3.1, weekly family allowances were
increased for the first or only child from £11.45 in April 1998 to £14.40 in April 1999 (an
increase of £2.50 plus indexation, or 20% in real terms) to £15.00 in April 2000 (up 3%
in real terms), while the increases in benefits for subsequent children were modest, only
to keep up with price inflation (£9.30 to £9.60 to £10 in the same period). Therefore,
households faced different absolute and relative increases in family allowances according
to the number of children they had, which provides some degree of cross-sectional as
well as time variation in the level of family benefits.
In addition, a lone-parent premium of £5.65 was being withdrawn for new claims
since July 6th, 1998 -thus effectively reducing child benefits for this group. Thus, single
parents who had been previous recipients of child benefits still received a high £17.10
allowance for the first child in 1998, while "new" single parents received the same as
two-parent families (£11.45).
As part of the set of measures to help families with children, the 1999 Budget also
included a tax credit available to all families with dependent children, the Children Tax
Credit. This program, which replaced the less generous married couple's allowance and
additional personal allowance programs, was only introduced in April 2001. Therefore,
an analysis limited to the years 1998 to 2000 of the effects on female labor force
participation of the Child Benefit program will not be confounded by the simultaneous
50 Child Benefit replaced an old program, Family Allowance, in March 1977. Family Allowance was
payable only to the second and subsequent children. Also, an old program called One Parent Benefit was
incorporated (as a lone-parent premium) into Child Benefit as of March 1997.
51 If a child, over 16, is in full-time non-advanced education (i.e.: up to A-level or NVQ level 3 standard) at
a recognized educational establishment, benefit may be paid for them until they reach age 19.
Exceptionally, Child Benefit can also be paid for a short period for 16 or 17 year olds who have just left
school and are registered for work or work based training for young people.
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presence of a tax credit program, while still being able to exploit the change in rules and
benefit levels for different groups as an identification strategy.
3.3. Theoretical Model
The decision to enter, reenter or remain in the labor market for a woman with children is
strongly linked with participating in the market for child care services. Hence, the cost of
child care must be an important determinant of women's labor force participation and
labor supply decisions. A simple static model of labor supply, fertility and the home
production of child care will show that, other things equal, a higher cost of market child
care will result in a lower probability of employment for the household member that
specializes in child care -typically the wife. Its impact on the hours of labor supplied in
the market is theoretically ambiguous and will depend on the relative strength of the
income and substitution effects.
Policies aimed at reducing the family's costs of child care should encourage labor
force participation of non-working women and possibly induce an increase in the labor
supply of female workers too. If these policies are successful in decreasing the private
cost (shadow price) of having children, they should also result in an increase in the
number of women who decide to have children. In countries with relatively low levels of
female attachment to the labor force, and where fertility rates are very low and in some
cases still decreasing, policymakers are naturally considering the adoption or
strengthening of such policies. Their success will have an impact, to some extent, on the
current and future size of the labor force, which in turn will determine the sustainability
of publicly funded, Pay-As-You-Go Social Security systems.
In order to discuss the effects on labor market outcomes (and on fertility) of
policy instruments such as family allowances and childcare subsidies, I will develop a
simple framework (loosely) based on the Gronau (1977) model of home production,
where market goods and household time are viewed, much in the spirit of Becker (1965),
as mere inputs in the production of those activities (or 'commodities', in his terminology)
that provide some (dis)utility to the agents.
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For simplicity, let us consider a full-certainty, one-period model of a one-person
household.5 2 This household is assumed to have preferences defined over market work
(Zw), child services (Zc) and leisure activities (ZL). Each one of these commodities
(activities) is 'produced' using a combination of goods (XI,..., Xk) and time inputs (T1,...,
Tm):
Z = fJ(XI,...Xk,T,...Tm) , i ={W, L, C} (3-1)
I will assume that market work (Zw) requires some time spent working or
commuting to the workplace (Tw), the purchase of child care services in the market (Xi),
and the purchase of other goods and services associated with work in the market, yet
unrelated to having children or enjoying leisure, such as transportation (X3). Child
services (Zc) are a combination of market child care services (XI), time spent in home
production of child care (Tc) and other goods and services associated with having
children, but not with market work or leisure, such as diapers or child clothes (X2).
Finally, leisure (ZL) is the result of time spent in leisure activities (TL) and the goods and
services consumed during that time (X4), which for simplicity are assumed to be different
from those involved in the production of either Zc or Zw. Formally, this means the
production technology equations in (1) can be rewritten as follows:
Zw =fw(XlX3, T, ) , (3-1-W)
Zc =fc (X,,X 2,T) ,and (3-1-C)
L = fL (X 4,TL) (3-1-L)
Note that I am assuming that no good Xi or time slot Ti is used as an input in the
production of more than one commodity or activity Zi, except for market child care X,.
The case of XI is a departure from the the usual Becker approach in that the same amount
52 1 will derive the implications of this model under the assumption that the wife is the one member of the
household who specializes in home production of child care services. Therefore, when the model predicts
any effect of a given policy change on labor force participation and labor supply, it will be implicitly
discussing female labor force participation and female labor supply.
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of the good is simultaneously used as an input in the production of both Zc and Zw, and
hence its cost cannot be uniquely allocated between those two commodities.53
The household maximizes its welfare,
U = U(ZW,ZC,ZL)
subject to two constraints: the budget constraint,
4
PiXi < wZw +o 
and the time constraint,
Tc +Tw +TL < T ,
(3-2)
(3-3)
(3-4)
where w denotes the wage rate, T is the total time available and yo stands for non-labor
sources of income.54
The maximization of (2) subject to these constraints, given the production
technology (l-W), (1-C) and (l-L), yields the necessary conditions for an optimum:
UC = A[PI (axi/aZc )+ P2 (aX2/azc) + i' (aOrc /ZC )] 'c ,
Uw = Li[pl (OX, /Z W ) + P3 (OX3 lZW ) + l (aTw laZ W)- W] = i/W , and
UL =,[P4 (aX4/aZL )+ W. (aTL laZL )] -aL ,
(3-5)
(3-6)
(3-7)
53 This is closer in spirit to the characteristics approach to consumer theory first developed in Lancaster
(1966). This view regards goods as 'public inputs', in the sense that the marginal contribution of one good
in the production of any given commodity ('characteristic', in his terminology) is completely independent
of its being an input in the production of a different characteristic. Becker's approach, while being arguably
less realistic, derives most of its power as an analytical tool precisely from ruling out this independence in
production. The model presented here does not require that, however, since all inputs other than XI have
been assumed to contribute to the production of only one commodity.
54 If the model describes the wife's choice between work in the market and home production of child care,
and if the husband's labor supply is assumed to be exogenous, then this term will include his labor
earnings.
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where ui (= aU/aZ i ) denotes the marginal utility of commodity Zi, A is the marginal
utility of income, and , is the shadow price of commodity Zi, which depends on the
marginal costs of the goods and time inputs involved in the production of Zi (this is, on
the marginal inputs valued at their respective prices -which are market prices pi in the
case of market goods, and the shadow price of time w' lu/A, where u is the marginal
utility of time, in the case of time inputs).55 The marginal rate of substitution in
consumption between commodities Zi and Z equals their shadow price ratio
(ui/u = iIkj )
Note that from (6), and normalizing Zw so that work is measured in time units
(and hence aTw /Zw = 1), we have that the shadow price of time wi equals
= w- [P '. (aXl/az )+ p3 (ax3/az )]+ (UW 1,2) (3-8)
If an individual is observed working for a wage w when, in order to work, she has to
incur the cost of purchasing market goods XI and X3 at prices pi and p3 and she obtains a
marginal disutility from work equal to u (negative), then it must be that the value she
places on her time is in fact lower than w (this is, she would still be willing to work for a
lower wage if she could do without XI and X3). Alternatively, some women whose
shadow price of time is equal to, or somewhat below, market wage w will not be
observed working because of the existence of child care costs and transportation costs,
which make work in the market not worth their while. This is true even if market work
does not yield any disutility to the individual.
In this approach to household consumption, where market goods are not the direct
source of utility, the demand for these goods is a derived demand. It is determined by the
demand for each activity or commodity and by the technology that transforms those
goods into these activities. Deriving the optimal combination of inputs in the production
of Zi requires solving for the cost minimization problem for each Zi. In this case,
however, the problem for Zw and Zc must be posed jointly, since one input is used
55 The optimum conditions (5)-(7) are obtained by maximizing the Lagrangian
L = U(ZC,ZW,ZL )+ wZW +YO -piX) +(T - T - T - T)
with respect to Zw, Zc and ZL, given the production technology described by (1- W), (-C) and (1-L).
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simultaneously in the production of both activities and its cost cannot be allocated
uniquely between them.56
The solution to these cost minimization problems are the familiar conditions that
the marginal rate of substitution in production equals the the input price ratio:
aZL/aTL = w(3-9)
aZL/aX 4 P4
azC/aTC _
-a, and (3-10)
aZC /OX2 P 2
aZWlaTw - W (3-11)
az, /ax 3 P3
while the solution to the problem for Zw and Zc includes a slightly adapted version of the
above:
aZC /ax, aZ /aXI , p
+ (3-12)
aZC /aTC azW /aTW w
The demand for each good will thus depend on its price, this is, on its marginal cost of
production, a key element of which is the value of time.
The solution to this model (i.e.: the equilibrium values of the twelve unknowns,
namely the goods inputs Xi, X 2, X3 and X 4, the time imputs Tw, T and TL, the
'commodities' Zw, Zc and ZL, the marginal utility of income A and the shadow price of
time -i) will satisfy the utility maximization problem's first order conditions (5), (6) and
(7), the cost minimization problems' first order conditions (9), (10), (11) and (12), the
56 In this case, the cost minimization problems are: maximizing
-P 4X4 -TL + rL L (X 4, TL)-ZL]
with respect to X 4 and TL , where ZL' comes from the utility maximization program above; and maximizing:
-plX -p 2X2 -p3X, -p3X3 - T;v + rc[ C(X,,X 2,T)- Zc*]+ w (X, X3,T) -ZW
with respect to XI, X2, X 3, Tc and Tw, and where ZL* and ZL* also come from utility maximization.
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budget constraint (3), the time constraint (4) and the production technology equations (1-
W), (-C) and (l-L) simultaneously.
The standard model of the theory of home production, consumption and labor
supply would correspond to the particular case where the following simplifying
assumptions are made: uw = 0, so the household only cares about child services and
leisure, and market work is simply a means to secure goods; Zw = Tw and ZL = TL, so no
inputs but time are necessary in order to work in the market and in order to enjoy leisure,
and aZClaX 2 = 0 (usually Zc = X + (Tc)). This extreme situation where the only
possible use of resources is to buy child care services (X), the analysis of an increase in
non-labor income yo is equivalent to that of a decrease in the price of child care pi. Child
care subsidies and family allowances will then be equivalent and have the same impact
on the decision to participate in the labor market. In this simple case where
aZw /X = 0, and hence work for pay is not associated with the purchase of child care
services in the market, there is an effect of child care subsidies on labor force
participation simply because, by reducing pi it is possible to buy more of XI with the
same resources, and therefore home production of child care becomes relatively less
productive. Since all the household can do with money is buy Xi, then the family can be
better off by reducing their home production of child care and using some of that free
time to work in the market and use the earnings to buy some child care services in the
market.
On the other hand, when the assumption that Zw /aXI = 0 is relaxed, so child care
services are an input in market work, then a reduction in the price of child care pi will
close the gap between the shadow price of time iv and the going market wage rate w, thus
making work for pay more attractive for all women -not only a lower p will allow her to
buy more of Xi, but she will also get to keep more of what she can earn in the labor
market, because now the costs associated with work will have been reduced. Hence, if,
say, the assumption aZ, L/X 4 = 0 is also relaxed, the additional earnings a woman will be
able to keep after the price of child care goes down can be spent in X 4 (or any other input
to any activity she might enjoy), which will indirectly raise her utility. To sum up, in the
more general model it is not necessary to assume that the good whose price is reduced is
a good that directly enters the woman's utility function, in order to obtain the result that
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such a price reduction will give her an incentive to work. (Actually, it is not even
necessary to assume that such good is an input in the production of a 'commodity' that
she enjoys -as long as it contributes to an activity, such as market work, that can allow
her to purchase inputs to other activities she might enjoy, this result will hold). Therefore,
the model presented here gives an interesting insight: variations in the price of child care
services (such as those induced by child care subsidies) may have a sizable effect on
labor supply, leisure and the probability of labor force participation, even if expenditures
in child care only amount to a tiny fraction of household spending, due to the price effect
of X1 through Zw. Variations in the sources of non-wage income (such as family
allowances), on the other hand, will not have this effect of closing the gap between iiv
and w, so their predicted effects in the generalized model will be the same as those in the
simple case -they may provide incentives to work in the market to the extent that they
turn home production of child care relatively less productive. The effects of family
allowances and of child care subsidies on female labor force participation can, then, be of
very different magnitudes according to this model.
3.4. Data and Econometric Framework
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) consists of some 5,500 households and
10,300 individuals drawn from 250 different areas of Great Britain and interviewed every
year since 1991. Despite the relatively small sample size compared to other UK surveys
available (such as the Labor Force Survey or the New Earnings Survey), the BHPS has
the main advantage of featuring information on the nature and the level of government
transfers, including Child Benefits, received monthly in the household. Other advantages
include the panel nature of the data and the lack of proxy respondents.
The sample used in this study is drawn from the 1998, 1999 and 2000 waves of
the BHPS, limited to women of working age (16 to 63 years old at the time of the 1998
survey) with one or more dependent children in at least one of the surveys. After
excluding cases with missing data, the sample contains 5,070 observations,
corresponding to 1,690 individuals interviewed in three consecutive years.
The main variables of interest are labor force status, family allowances, and some
of the demographic determinants of the level of benefit awarded, such as marital status or
the number and age of dependent children. All values for these variables refer to
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September of the survey year, and all monetary values have been converted into real
terms using the UK Retail Price Index series, and are expressed in constant September
2000 British pounds. Descriptive statistics, general and organized by year, are reported in
Table 3.2. The great majority of women in the sample received family allowances in
September of the survey year (over 85%, as reported in Table 3.2). This high take-up rate
should come as no surprise given that the program does not involve the levels of
complexity and the stigma usually associated with means-tested benefits.
As an econometric framework for studying the effect of family allowances on
labor force participation of women, consider the following equations57:
flfip =a allow, + Ziflo + Xait P, + t + Ui + it (3-15)
allowt, = Zito + Xbit,,b + + Vi + q7it (3-16a)
where flfpi, is a binary variable indicating whether female individual i is actively
participating in the labor market at time t, allowt is the level of family allowances (child
benefit) received by i at time t, Zi, is a vector of demographic characteristics of the mother
that determine the level of benefits she receives (such as marital status or the number of
children), and the X's are vectors of individual and household characteristics that might
include both fixed variables (region, race, education) and variables that might change
over time (age, household size, other welfare benefits, other non-wage income, etc.)58.
Lastly, u and v represent unobservable individual-specific determinants of female labor
force participation (such as distaste for work) and of family allowances (such as
knowledge of the process necessary to claim the benefits) respectively, and 0 are time
effects, and eand q are disturbances.
The parameter of interest, a in equation (3-15), is the "causal effect" of family
allowances on female labor force participation: it gives the expected increase in the
probability of being active if a randomly selected member of the female population were
57 In the very short run (such as one year, in this case), it is reasonably safe to assume that we can abstract
from the effect of family allowances on the number of children, and thus treat the latter as an exogenous
variable in equation (3-15).
58 In fact, Xb may well be empty (i.e.: no observable characteristic of the recipient affects the level of
benefits), but that is completely irrelevant to the identification of equation (3-15).
105
to receive an additional monetary unit (£1) in monthly child benefits59. Estimation of
equation (3-15) is complicated, however, by the fact that and qr are likely to be
correlated. A mother who is strongly motivated to work may also be relatively more
aware of the existence of the benefit, and may have more knowledge of the process to
claim it.
Note that equation (3-16a) is only valid as long as there is no change in policy. If
there is a change in how benefits are determined, however, and this change affects how,
say, marital status or the number of children contribute to the computation of the level of
benefits received, then this equation should be as follows,
allowi = Zit o + Zit * post, O + Xbi,Yb + 0 +Vi +vi it (3-16b)
where postt is an indicator of whether the change in the determination of benefits has
taken place as of time t. In that case, Zi,t*postt can be used as an instrument in equation (3-
15), thus allowing for the identification of a.
More precisely, the identifying instruments in this model are those factors that
provided a mother with a different level of benefits before and after the policy change.
Since the standard rate for the first child increased dramatically over this period, whereas
the rate for subsequent children remained pretty much constant in real terms, one natural
candidate for an instrument is an indicator for whether a woman has, after the policy
change, a 'new' baby -this is, whether she has a child who is at most one year old. This
builds on the reasonable assumption that parents are more likely to claim benefits soon
after the birth of a new child (and will probably be more likely to do so if the benefits are
higher), rather than several years after the birth of the last child. Also, since the lone
parent premium was abolished and no longer available for new claims after 1998, another
plausible instrument should be an indicator for whether a woman has become a new
single mother after the policy change. In terms of the notation used above, Z will consist
of the variables 'new baby' and 'single mother of new baby', which have just been
defined. Hence, in order to estimate a I will run regressions of labor force participation
on family allowances and a set of controls, including time, 'new baby' and 'single mother
59 A linear equation is specified, despite the binary nature of the dependent variable, for ease of
interpretation and estimation.
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of new baby' main effects, and I will use the interaction between 'new baby' and post and
'single mother of new baby' and post as instruments for the level of benefits.
The validity of the estimates obtained using these instruments will hinge on the
assumption that there are no significant differences over time in how having a new baby,
holding everything else constant, affects the probability of participating in the labor
market, and in how having a new baby while being a single mother, holding everything
else fixed, affects the decision to participate in the labor market. In other words, the 'new
baby' and 'single mother of new baby' main effects are assumed to be constant over time.
If this assumption were incorrect then the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates
would be biased. It is hard, however, to think of a plausible reason why unobserved
determinants of the decision to participate in the labor market would be different for
mothers of a six-month-year-old than for mothers of a three-year-old in a given year, but
not in another previous period.
3.5. Results
Table 3.3 presents estimates of equation (3-15). Each column reports estimates of a from
a different specification or obtained by a different method. The first two columns control
for the number of dependent children separated by age group, whereas the third and
fourth columns use dummies for the exclusive presence of children in each age group
instead, a specification very similar to that used by Blau and Tekin (2002) in their study
of the effects of child care subsidies on labor outcomes. Also, because of the panel nature
of the data, I use fixed effects and random effects regression methods for each of those
specifications. In all cases, increases in the level of benefits appear to be associated with
significant increases in the likelihood of labor market activity. Taking receipt of family
allowances as truly exogenous, we would conclude that the causal effect of child benefits
on female labor force participation is positive. It has already been noted, however, that
treating variation in family allowances as exogenous is not reasonable, since there is
likely to be a correlation between unobserved, potentially time-varying determinants of
labor market participation and unobserved factors that affect the receipt and hence the
level of child benefits. Therefore, I refrain from giving a causal interpretation to the
effects estimated in this table. It is useful, however, to note how different the fixed effects
and random effects estimates are. In fact, a standard Hausman test of the difference in the
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coefficients rejects the null hypothesis that they are estimating the same vector of
parameters.60 In other words, there must be some unobserved individual-specific
characteristics that are correlated with the observed explanatory variables in the equation,
hence rendering the random effects estimator inconsistent. For this reason, the remainder
of this empirical analysis will only use fixed effects models.
Table 3.4 presents fixed effects 2SLS estimates of the same two specifications as
in Table 3.3, using the interaction between the time variable post and the demographic
variables 'new baby' and 'single mother of new baby' as identifying instruments. The
validity of this instruments is shown in Panel a of Table 3.4, which reports results from
regressions of monthly family allowances on 'new baby'*post and 'single mother of new
baby'*post, along with controls also included in previous regressions.61 There is a large
and statistically significant positive relationship between having recently had a baby and
family allowances received, after the policy change. The effect is even larger than the
pure mechanical effect of the increase in the standard rate for the first child. As discussed
in Section 2, the standard weekly rate was raised some £3 in real terms, while the rate for
subsequent children was only increased just enough to keep up with price inflation.
Therefore, if all eligible families had been claiming benefits at all times, family
allowances should have increased by a little over £12 a month in real terms. The fact that
the average increase in observed benefits for that group exceeded that figure suggests that
the probability of receipt also went up after the introduction of higher rates of benefits6 2 .
In other words, the results are consistent with increases in the generosity of the system
affecting take up rates positively, and hence raising average observed benefits for those
families more likely to be favored by the policy change. This seems to validate the
identification strategy used in Table 3.4.
60 For the difference between the coefficients in columns (1) and (2), the Hausman test statistic is 135.51,
while for columns (3) and (4) it is 133.03. In both cases, this is way beyond the critical value in the chi-
square distribution with thirteen degrees of freedom, which equals 27.69 for a type-I error of .01. In fact,
the associated p-value for the null hypotheses of no systematic difference is <.0001 in both cases.
61 In terms of the notation used in the previous section, Table 4a presents estimates of equation (3-16b),
where I am allowing for Xb to include all the elements in Xa, this is, I am allowing for any observable
characteristic of the individual or the household to affect the decision to claim family allowances, and
hence the level of benefits received.
62 Indeed, among recent mothers with a baby who is at most one year old at the time of the survey, the
fraction receiving child benefits becomes higher every year. In September 2000, it is .954, some ten
percentage points above the average for the whole sample, thus supporting the claim that the increase in
benefits resulted in an increase in take-up rates increased among recent mothers of new babies.
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Adding 'single mother of new baby'*post to the regression raises the previous
coefficient a bit, while that variable itself enters with a fairly large and negative
coefficient, although the standard error is too large to make it statistically significant. The
sign and size of the effect, however, are consistent with the details of the policy change,
by which new claimants would no longer be eligible for the lone parent premium. Hence,
new single mothers will receive less than their veteran counterparts, and for that very
same reason are less likely to claim the benefits in the first place, thus resulting in an
even larger negative effect on observed benefits of being a single mother of a new baby
after the policy change. While the sign and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for
'single mother of new baby'*post is perfectly reasonable, its low t-statistic suggests
precaution is in order when interpreting any 2SLS results where it has been used as an
instrument.
The standard errors in the FE 2SLS estimates are six to eight times larger than in
the simple FE models, and hence inferences are less precise.63 The estimated effect of
family allowances on labor force participation of women in the sample is negative and
ranges from -.00009 to -.00062, as is shown in panel b of Table 3.4. Even though the
coefficient estimates are always less than their standard error, the point estimates are
much lower than the simple fixed effect estimates that did not correct for the potential
endogeneity problem, suggesting that the simple FE estimates are biased upward.
While the sign of the estimated effect is now in line with the prediction of the
theory, its magnitude is small. Taken at face value, and abstracting from the fact that they
are not statistically significant, the point estimates in column (1) imply an elasticity of
female labor force participation with respect to family allowances of -. 01, compared to an
elasticity of-.04 for other benefits and -.08 for other non-wage income. Put another way,
the estimates suggest that, while it would take a 12.5% increase in non-wage income or a
25% increase in other benefits in order to reduce female labor force participation of
mothers by one percentage point, the equivalent increase in family allowances necessary
to bring down the activity rate of mothers also by one point would be 100%. Even the
63 As can be computed from the summary statistics presented in Table 2, out of the 1,690 women included
in the sample only 156 were in the 'newbaby*post' group, and only 27 were in the 'single mother of new
baby *post' group, which are relatively small numbers and account for the increase in the standard errors in
the FE 2SLS estimates. A Hausman test for the equality of the FE 2SLS and the simple FE coefficients
cannot reject the null hypothesis.
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more negative estimates obtained in columns (3) or (4) would not imply an elasticity any
bigger (in absolute value) than -.08, which would make the effect of family allowances
roughly comparable to that of other sources of income. In any case, given the large
standard errors of these estimates it seems reasonable to conclude that the effect is bound
to be small. Table 3.4 certainly provides no evidence whatsoever of large negative effects
of family allowances on female labor force participation.
3.6. Conclusion
Critics of family allowances routinely claim that these subsidies imply a strong
disincentive to female labor force participation. While economic theory predicts that any
increase in unearned income will indeed result in a few women withdrawing from the
labor market, the empirical estimates in this study suggest that such effect is small and
statistically insignificant.
A possible explanation for these results is that households devote increases in
allowances mostly to childcare expenditures, and hence any changes in the generosity of
the program will not significantly affect the demand for any other commodity, including
market work. In order to test for this explanation, it would be interesting to explore
whether (and to what extent) expenditures in childcare respond to changes in family
allowances. Unfortunately, such data were not available for most observations in our
sample.
Arguably, the size of the change in benefits induced by this program might have
not been salient enough to trigger a measurable behavioral response. Admittedly, the
policy change and the dataset used in this paper do not constitute the equivalent to an
extremely powerful experiment involving random assignment, which would settle the
discussion around the question posed. Nevertheless, this study is a first attempt at
measuring the effect on labor force participation of a truly exogenous variation in family
allowances.
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Table 3.1
Rates of Child Benefit, 1996-2002 (£ per week)
Date First Child First Child Subsequent Children
(Lone Parent)
08/04/1996 £10.80 £17.10 £8.80
07/04/1997 £ 11.05 £ 17.10 a £9.00
06/04/1998 £11.45 £17.10b £9.30
12/04/1999 £ 14.40 £ 17.10 £9.60
10/04/2000 £15.00 £17.55 £10.00
09/04/2001 £15.50 £17.55 £10.35
11/04/2002 £15.75 £17.55 £10.55
Source: Department of Social Security (Various years), Social Security Statistics, London: Government
Statistical Service; Child Poverty Action Group (2000) Welfare Benefits Handbook 2000/2001, London:
CPAG.
Notes:
a In April 1997, the premium for lone parents, One Parent Benefit, was abolished and incorporated into the
main Child Benefit rates to give the new benefit Child Benefit (Lone Parent).
b On 06/07/98, new claims by lone parents could only be made at standard Child Benefit rates. However,
existing lone parent claimants could continue to claim the higher rate Child Benefit (Lone Parent).
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics for the British Household Panel samples
Variables 1998-2000 1998 1999 2000
Dependent Variable
Active
(Female Labor Force Participation)
Monthly Family Allowance, if any
Fraction Receiving Family Allowance
Other Benefits
Other Non-Wage Income
No Partner
Household Size
Has Kids 0-4 Years Old
Has Kids 5-11 Years Old
Has Kids 12-16 Years Old
Age
New Baby
Single Mother of New Baby
N
.590
(.492)
Regressor
100.09
(41.73)
.851
(.356)
Covariates
140.26
(275.40)
1,169.13
(1,350.94)
.271
(.444)
4.06
(1.18)
.313
(.464)
.620
(.485)
.407
(.491)
33.69
(8.94)
Instruments
.150
(.357)
.023
(.150)
5,070
.556
(.497)
98.50
(41.45)
.849
(.358)
128.79
(263.10)
1,130.99
(1,330.96)
.273
(.446)
4.06
(1.20)
.362
(.481)
.635
(.482)
.353
(.478)
32.69
(8.90)
.199
(.400)
.026
(.159)
1,690
.596
(.491)
99.32
(42.01)
.856
(.351)
142.89
(280.31)
1,151.68
(1,316.35)
.256
(.436)
4.06
(1.17)
.314
(.464)
.617
(.486)
.404
(.491)
33.69
(8.90)
.158
(.365)
.027
(.161)
1,690
.617
(.486)
102.47
(41.66)
.849
(.359)
149.09
(282.16)
1,224.73
(1,402.93)
.283
(.451)
4.06
(1.18)
.263
(.440)
.609
(.488)
.462
(.499)
34.69
(8.90)
.092
(.290)
.016
(.125)
1,690
Notes: The data are from the British Household Panel for 1998 through 2000, with the sample restricted to
women of working age (16-64) with children under 18 in the household in September of at least one of the
three survey years. Standard deviations are in parentheses. All other entries are means. 'No Partner' is
coded as one if the woman is neither married nor cohabiting with a partner. 'New Baby' is coded as one if a
woman has a child who is at most one year old in September of the survey year, and zero otherwise. 'Single
Mother of New Baby' is coded as one for single women who have had a child who is at most one year old
in September of the survey year, and zero otherwise. All monetary values have been converted into real
terms using the UK Retail Price Index series, and are expressed in constant September 2000 British pounds.
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Table 3.3
Fixed- and Random-Effects Estimates of the Effect of Family Allowances on Labor Participation
Fixed Effects Random Fixed Effects Random
Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Allowance
Other Benefits
Other Non-Wage Income
No Partner
Household Size
Number Kids 0-4 Years Old
Number Kids 5-11 Years Old
Number Kids 12-16 Years Old
Children 0-4 Only
Children 5-11 Only
Children 12-16 Only
Age
Age Squared
New Baby
Single Mother of New Baby
.00092
(.00023)
-.00017
(.00003)
-.00004
(.00001)
.0696
(.0287)
.0152
(.0136)
-.0390
(.0177)
-.0034
(.0140)
-.0085
(.0162)
.0791
(.0205)
-.00058
(.00027)
-.0297
(.0201)
.0322
(.0437)
.00044
(.00018)
-.00032
(.00003)
-.00003
(.00001)
.0321
(.0216)
-.0126
(.0093)
-.0747
(.0152)
-.0372
(.0114)
-.0220
(.0134)
.0737
(.0066)
-.00094
(.00010)
-.0408
(.0193)
.0928
(.0407)
.00090
(.00023)
-.00017
(.00003)
-.00004
(.00001)
.0646
(.0287)
.0060
(.0128)
-.0382
(.0272)
.0130
(.0161)
-.0586
(.0556)
.0780
(.0205)
-.00057
(.00027)
-.0363
(.0197)
.0312
(.0437)
.00027
(.00018)
-.00032
(.00003)
-.00003
(.00001)
.0284
(.0218)
-.0328
(.0080)
-.0299
(.0221)
.0107
(.0143)
-.0753
(.0494)
.0693
(.0065)
-.00086
(.00009)
-.0587
(.0183)
.0841
(.0407)
Notes: The data are from the British Household Panel for 1998 through 2000, with the sample restricted to
women of working age (16-64) with children under 18 in the household in September of at least one of the
three survey years. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Entries are estimates from regressions of
Female Labor Force Participation in September of the survey year (i.e.: the discrete choice variable
'Active', which is coded as one if the woman is in the labor force, and zero otherwise), on family
allowances received that month. All regressions contain year main effects, and Random Effects regressions
also contain a set of seven education dummies and twenty region dummies as controls. The sample size is
5,070.
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Table 3.4a
Interactions of Demographics and Time as Instruments for Family Allowances:
First-Stage Estimates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
New Baby * Post 17.85 19.25 18.49 19.92
(2.25) (2.46) (2.21) (2.43)
Single Mother of New Baby * -7.48 -7.53
Post (5.28) (5.29)
Notes: The data are from the British Household Panel for 1998 through 2000, with the sample restricted to
women of working age (16-64) with children under 18 in the household in September of at least one of the
three survey years. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Entries are OLS estimates of the effect of
demographic variables interacted with time on family allowances. 'New Baby' is coded as one if a woman
has a child who is at most one year old in September of the survey year, and zero otherwise. 'Single Mother
of New Baby' is coded as one for single women who have had a child who is at most one year old in
September of the survey year, and zero otherwise. All regressions contain the same controls as in Table
3.4b, so the specifications in columns (1) through (4) in this table correspond to the specifications in
columns (1) through (4) in Table 3.4b. The sample size is 5,070.
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Table 3.4b
Fixed-Effects IV Estimates of the Effect of Family Allowances on Labor Force Participation
FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Allowance
Other Benefits
Other Non-Wage Income
No Partner
Household Size
No. Kids aged 0-4
No. Kids aged 5-11
No. Kids aged 12-16
Children 0-4 Only
Children 5-11 Only
Children 12-16 Only
Age
Age Squared
Post
New Baby
Single Mother of New Baby
-.00009
(.00169)
-.00015
(.00005)
-.00004
(.00001)
.0703
(.0288)
.0167
(.0138)
-.0350
(.0189)
-.0009
(.0147)
-.0060
(.0167)
.0830
(.0215)
-.00060
(.00028)
-.0212
(.0167)
-.0282
(.0203)
.0395
(.0454)
-.00014
(.00166)
-.00015
(.00005)
-.00004
(.00001)
.0703
(.0288)
.0167
(.0138)
-.0348
(.0189)
-.0008
(.0147)
-.0059
(.0167)
.0832
(.0215)
-.00063
(.00028)
-.0211
(.0167)
-.0281
(.0203)
.0399
(.0454)
-.00058
(.00160)
-.00014
(.00005)
-.00003
(.00001)
.0662
(.0289)
.0101
(.0136)
-.0369
(.0274)
.0120
(.0163)
-.0564
(.0560)
.0832
(.0214)
-.00062
(.00028)
-.0210
(.0168)
-.0332
(.0201)
.0426
(.0456)
-.00062
(.00158)
-.00013
(.00005)
-.00003
(.00001)
.0662
(.0289)
.0102
(.0135)
-.0369
(.0274)
.0120
(.0163)
-.0564
(.0560)
.0833
(.0214)
-.00062
(.00028)
-.0210
(.0168)
-.0331
(.0201)
.0429
(.0456)
Notes: The data are from the British Household Panel for 1998 through 2000, with the sample restricted to
women of working age (16-64) with children under 18 in the household in September of at least one of the
three survey years. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Entries are estimates of the effect of Family
Allowances on Female Labor Force Participation, namely the discrete choice variable 'Active', which is
coded as one if the woman is in the labor force, and zero otherwise. 'Post' equals one for observations after
1999, and zero otherwise. 'New Baby' is coded as one if a woman has a child who is at most one year old
in September of the survey year, and zero otherwise. 'Single Mother of New Baby' is coded as one for
single women who have had a child who is at most one year old in September of the survey year, and zero
otherwise. The sample size is 5,070.
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